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Over the years, scholars have continually debated the effect that foreign assistance 
has had on recipient countries.  This study aims to continue research in that area by 
exploring the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance to Colombia.  Specifically, my 
research is designed to investigate the effect of U.S. foreign assistance in three broad 
areas of Colombian society: law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and drug production.   
Using available data that covers the years 1980-2002, I perform a multivariate 
time-series analysis to assess the impact of U.S. foreign assistance on six key dependent 
variables; these variables have been selected to illuminate the three broad areas 
mentioned above.  The dependent variables—and the broader categories with which they 
are associated—are as follows: first, in order to measure the impact of U.S. foreign 
assistance on drug related law enforcement in Colombia, I analyze a change in the 
number of drug labs destroyed, the amount of cocaine and base seized (kilos), and the 
amount of coca sprayed (ha) by aerial fumigation; next, I measure the effect of U.S. 
foreign assistance on guerrilla violence by regressing foreign assistance on the number of 
persons kidnapped (per thousand inhabitants) and number of homicides (per thousand 
inhabitants); finally, in order to measure the effect of U.S. foreign assistance on the 
overall drug production in Colombia, I regress the amount of foreign assistance on the 
total amount of estimated cultivation of coca (ha) in Colombia.   
In the areas of law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and drug production, findings 
in this study indicate there is no positive correlation between the amount of foreign 
assistance given to Colombia from 1980-2002, and any of the aforementioned dependent 
variables. 
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However, results indicate that the Colombian president’s party affiliation, 
Colombia’s GDP per capita, and Colombia’s ‘level of democracy’ (as measured by Polity 
IV scores) may have a noteworthy relationship to the overall effectiveness of Colombia’s 
law enforcement.  Further, when assessing attempts to curb guerrilla violence—in the 
form of kidnappings and homicides—Colombia’s presidential party affiliation and its 
GDP per capita may also be a determinant of change in violence.  Finally, when testing 
for a change in levels of Colombia’s drug production, Colombia’s level of democracy, its 
rural population density, and its unemployment rate indicate statistically significant 
relationships.  
Given these findings, my research suggests that past U.S. foreign assistance given 
to Colombia, has no significant relationship to assisting Colombia in the successful 
attainment of any of the following goals: increasing law enforcement, decreasing 
guerrilla violence, or decreasing drug production.  Other variables, though, may play a 
role in the attainment of these goals.  As such, the effectiveness of foreign assistance 
should continue to be carefully analyzed in order to reevaluate its overall objectives and 
the methods chosen to pursue those objectives—as the United States continues assistance 
to Colombia.  This study suggests that future foreign assistance to Colombia should focus 
on promoting good policies, strong institutions, and eliminating opportunities for 
corruption.  Furthermore, aid should focus on dual positive effects of improving the lives 
of the Colombian people and mitigating the impact of the drug trade.  
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Introduction 
 For the past forty years, the inability of the Colombian government to reduce 
guerrilla violence and to decrease drug trafficking has had a dramatic impact on the 
country at large.  Insurrection, riot, murder, torture, terrorism, and chaos were not just the 
story of Colombia’s past; instead, they continue to be a concern for Colombians today.  
Overall increases in drug activity and guerrilla violence, as well as a lack of law 
enforcement and military efforts, have resulted in an ongoing internal conflict.  As a 
result, Colombia is currently the most violent nation in South America and one of the 
most dangerous places in the world (Sarmeinto 1997:1).     
Violence is not a new phenomenon to the people of Colombia.  Instead, it has 
been a common theme throughout Colombia’s history.  Violence reached its peak during 
the period known as la violenca, an era whose effects lasted many years.  Guerrilla 
activity initially emerged during this time—in response to political violence.  Guerrillas 
organized during la violencia in order to protect the people; however, this would all 
change when existing guerrilla groups began to work with drug traffickers, providing 
them with services and protection.  The relationship between illegally armed groups and 
drug traffickers would become increasingly intertwined and made it difficult to assess 
who was responsible for what.  Major consequences of this close relationship became 
noticeable in the 1980s.  By this time, one thing was certain, guerrilla groups no longer 
existed as a means of protection for the people.  Instead, the guerrilla groups were 
responsible for the disappearance, kidnapping, and murder of many innocent lives.  To 
this day, proceeds from the drug trade have made it feasible for guerrilla groups to 
operate in all areas of Colombia, terrorizing the entire public, from the rich to the poor.  
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As guerrilla groups increasingly profited from the illegal drug industry, the 
Colombian government has continued to struggle to stop them.  For example, today, 
Colombia produces and distributes more heroin than any other country in the Western 
Hemisphere.  In addition, it is the world’s leading producer and distributor of cocaine 
(Rabasa 2001:11).  Approximately 90% of the world’s cocaine industry originates in, or 
passes through, Colombia (Veilette 2005:3).   
Guerrilla groups and drug traffickers have been especially successful due to the 
profit made from the drug trade, along with the geological make up of the country.  
Colombia’s volcanic soil and mountainous jungles have provided an ideal environment 
for the growth and production of drugs.  As a result, many areas in Colombia have been 
difficult for the government to monitor—making it easier for illegal drug activity to 
persist.  Overall, the Colombian military has had very little success combating the war on 
drugs.  As a result, profits from the drug trade have allowed guerrilla groups to become 
wealthier and more powerful than the Colombian government itself. 
  After failing at to enact peace treaties with existing guerilla organizations such as 
the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia), the ELN (Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional), and the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia), Colombian 
officials have turned to the United States for assistance.  In 1999, Colombian President 
Pastrana drafted a six-year initiative called Plan Colombia, a proposal to help end the 
country’s conflict, eliminate drug trafficking, and promote social and economic 
development.  In support of this plan, the United States agreed to provide $1.3 billion in 
economic, military, and narcotics assistance.  By doing so, the United States nearly 
tripled overall assistance being sent to Colombia.  In 2002, the Bush administration 
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continued funding under Plan Colombia in addition to requesting more assistance under 
The Andean Counter-drug Initiative (ACI).  Through the ACI, foreign aid is given to 
Colombia to eradicate coca and opium crops, interdict narcotics trafficking, protect the 
country’s infrastructure, train Colombia’s security forces, support alternative crop 
development programs, and preserve democracy.   
Ever since the 1990s, a significant amount of U.S. foreign aid has been distributed 
to Colombia in order to assist the Colombian government in reaching specific objectives.  
However, the effectiveness of foreign assistance has been a topic of continual debate 
among scholars.  For instance, while some experts say that foreign assistance has 
generally been successful, others claim that foreign assistance does not help alleviate a 
country’s problems at all.  Since theory regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid is split, 
one could ask the question: given that Colombia has received such a large portion of U.S. 
foreign assistance over the years, exactly how effective has foreign assistance been at 
successfully influencing the country?  Specifically, how has aid affected areas of 
Colombian society such as its law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and overall drug 
production? 
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1. The Effectiveness of Foreign Assistance 
The Benefits of Foreign Aid 
While it may seem obvious how foreign assistance can benefit a recipient country, 
in most instances, distributing foreign assistance actually benefits the donor both 
economically and militarily.  From a U.S. (donor) perspective, the economic interest of 
other countries is important to the well-being of the United States.  The U.S. economy 
depends greatly upon the import of raw materials from other nations, along with the 
potentially large consumer’s market from developing countries (Black 1968:17).  
Therefore, if developing countries experience economic growth, it is likely to benefit the 
United States.  
Although there is an economic incentive to give foreign aid, perhaps the greatest 
benefit is seen from a military perspective.  The United States can use military aid, 
training, and equipment to significantly influence a country to comply with its requests.  
This is called leverage, and was especially evident during the Cold War, when aid was 
used to help create a much-needed, worldwide defense network against the threat of 
communism (Sislin 1994:668).   
Leverage has also been a successful tool for ending international confrontations, 
such as the Arab-Israeli war of 1973.  In this instance, Nixon promised the Israeli military 
more assistance after the war, but only if it accepted a cease-fire.  However, the U.S. also 
threatened to take away aid if Israel continued to engage in warfare.  Here, the United 
States was able to use positive and negative sanctions to produce a desired outcome 
(Sislin 1994:666-668).   
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In addition to creating leverage, military aid is sometimes used as a symbol of 
power among wealthy nations.  In the article, “Foreign Assistance: Objectives and 
Consequences,” Griffin and Enos find that countries who donate assistance are those 
countries that have money to spare.  Therefore, aid is sometimes donated to yield political 
support from developing countries; this makes it look as if the donating country has more 
international support than others (Griffin 1970:316).  This seems to be the case with the 
United States during the Cold War.  Assistance was given to developing countries, in 
order to form more allies than the Soviet Union.  There were few real objectives of that 
assistance other than stopping the spread of communism.  How would the United States 
achieve that?  By funding a country’s military and giving money to those in power. 
Finally, military assistance is sometimes used to promote democratic principles.  
This is especially true with recent programs such as Bush’s Millennium Challenge 
Account.  When U.S. foreign aid programs successfully promote democracy abroad, the 
probability that the United States will go to war with that country is lowered, since 
democratic nations are significantly less likely to engage in war with other democratic 
nations (Carothers 1995:2).   
Not only does this decrease the chance of war, but giving aid to these countries 
allows the U.S. military to have an inside look at what is going on in various areas around 
the world.  For example, although the United States takes a financial risk by spending so 
much money on Plan Colombia, the plan does allow for U.S. involvement in key strategic 
locations in the Caribbean, South America, and the Eastern Pacific.  It enables the United 
States to be directly involved in maintaining the stability of a country that is the fifth 
largest trading partner in Latin America for the United States, and the tenth largest 
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supplier of oil (Marcella 2003:2).  It also provides the U.S. military surveillance aircraft 
support for Pentagon counter-drug operations (Clarke 2000:1).  Distributing foreign aid 
opens the door for the United States to have power in many areas of the world, possibly 
shaping ideology abroad, and in turn, improving U.S. security at home. 
The Potential Benefits of Receiving Foreign Aid  
Although the United States benefits from giving aid, ironically, it is debated 
among scholars how much a recipient country actually benefits from the foreign aid it 
receives.  Ideally, the recipient nation benefits not only economically from receiving aid, 
but militarily as well.  In addition, aid can potentially change the living conditions for 
people across the globe, especially in underdeveloped countries. 
 From an economic standpoint, in some instances, aid has helped decrease poverty 
in many areas of the world.  According to the United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP), foreign assistance has been successful in decreasing poverty worldwide.  
According to them, due to aid, “poverty has been reduced more in the past 50 years than 
in the past 500” (Thérien 2000:23).  In addition to reducing poverty, aid has also 
increased the quality of life for many people.  In some instances, aid has helped to 
decrease child mortality and the spread of disease.  It has also improved access to clean 
water and has promoted overall health.  Foreign aid programs have even been successful 
in promoting women’s rights and increasing education opportunities for boys and girls 
worldwide (Thérien 2000:22).  Programs have successfully built infrastructure, promoted 
agriculture and manufacturing, and provided skilled manpower (Cassen 1994:10).  
Overall, well-designed aid projects can help support public institutions which, in turn, 
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improve experimentation, learning, and implementation of new service ideas (World 
Bank 1998:3).   
From a military perspective, aid can increase security within various countries by 
providing a larger military, better training, and excellent military equipment.  It also can 
increase stability within the country through “election monitoring, institution-building, 
and capacity development” (Thérien 2000:23).  By promoting democracy, foreign 
assistance can have a direct positive influence on the peace and security within a nation. 
Aid Effectiveness-Both Sides Presented 
Existing literature regarding the actual effect that foreign assistance has on a 
recipient country in terms of growth, is split, and sometimes referred to as the “micro-
macro paradox” (Durbarry 1998:1).  This paradox alludes to the fact that while foreign 
aid projects have been evaluated as relatively successful in achieving the specific goals 
they set forth and therefore have had individual effects (e.g. Cassen 1986); studies 
conducted at the nation-wide level indicate that, foreign assistance has little to no direct 
relationship with the growth of the recipient country.  In other words, while micro-based 
studies have found that aid is effective, at the macro-level, studies have resulted in more 
ambiguous results.  For example, some scholars have found that as aid increased to 
developing countries, the country’s growth rate was unaffected or even hindered.  Other 
studies find that foreign assistance is a determinant of growth, under the right recipient 
environment.  This section explores past studies that have tested the relationship between 
aid and growth in developing countries. 
Although aid has the potential to do great things, the degree to which aid directly 
affects the growth rate of a recipient country is difficult to measure and has been debated 
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among scholars.  In the early 1970s, Griffin and Enos tested the effectiveness of aid by 
analyzing fifteen African and Asian countries from 1962-1964.  Their studies concluded 
that there was not an association between the amount of foreign aid received and the 
GNP growth rate (Griffin 1970:317).  In addition to African and Asian countries, they 
also analyze the average growth rate of twelve Latin American countries from 1957-
1964.  Their analysis concluded that as foreign assistance increased to Latin American 
countries, the growth rate of the recipient country decreased (Griffin 1970:318).    
Overall, Griffin and Enos found that foreign assistance was not associated with 
the growth rate of the recipient country.  In the instance that foreign assistance was 
correlated with growth, foreign aid had a negative effect on the growth rate.  They argue 
that an overall increase in aid led to lower savings on behalf of the recipient country.  In 
addition they argued that, in some instances, aid also slowed down long-run economic 
growth by changing methods of investment that did not benefit the recipient country 
(Griffin 1970:323). 
Years later, Peter Boon furthered the study on aid’s effectiveness, when he 
conducted a study in which he looked at aid to 97 countries between 1971 and 1990.  
Boon’s results were similar to those of Griffin and Enos.  In his analysis, Boon found that 
aid did not increase investment nor did it promote growth.  According to Boon, not only 
was aid ineffective in terms of economic growth, but he argued that aid did not reduce 
poverty or even address basic human needs.  In his study, Boon found that foreign aid 
had an insignificant effect on alleviating poverty, increasing life expectancy, decreasing 
infant mortality, or improving primary schooling ratios (Boon 1996: 293).  One reason 
for this is because, according to Boon, poverty is not caused by capital shortage, but 
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instead, caused by political policies that do not consider the poor.  The reason that aid is 
not associated with growth is because aid does not change these policies.  In fact, 
according to Boon, foreign assistance may even harm the recipient country.  Boon found 
that foreign assistance may actually increase inequality by giving assistance that benefits 
the elite and does not reach the poor (Boon 1996:289-329).   
Ian Vasquez also looked at the correlation between aid flows and economic 
growth.  His findings were consistent with those of Griffin and Boon.  Vasquez 
discovered disappointing results in his study of aid that was distributed to 73 countries 
from 1971 to 1995.  He stated: 
Neither aid per capita, nor aid as percentage of GDP, was positively correlated 
with economic growth. (In fact, aid as a percentage of GDP has a slightly negative 
correlation with economic growth).  When broken down by the various aid 
sources, the lack of any positive correlation with growth holds despite the fact that 
the various bilateral and multilateral agencies have emphasized different 
approaches to lending (the World Bank, for example only lends to governments, 
while the U.S. Agency for International Development can approve credit directly 
to nongovernmental organizations and other private groups) even though a 
common principle objective has been the promotion of growth (Vasquez 1998:2). 
 
According to Vasquez, aid does not promote growth because of conflicting goals between 
the donor and recipient countries.  In addition, aid does not go to the people; it goes to the 
government.  As a result, overall consumption may increase, but aid does not increase 
investment which leads to growth. 
Griffin, Boon, and Vasquez all failed to find a positive significant link between 
aid and growth.  Their research was confirmed by a study in 1997 by the Congressional 
Budget Office, which stated that, “foreign aid, overall, appears to have only a marginal 
effect on development and may even hinder it” (cited in Vasquez 1998:2).  In addition, a 
study conducted by the World Bank in 1994 showed that the majority of the aid bypasses 
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the poor (Vasquez 1998:2).  According to the World Bank, too many developing 
countries take on projects, supported by foreign assistance, which are not designed to 
create growth or have an effect on poverty.  Instead, programs mainly benefit the rich 
(World Bank 1998:2). 
In sum, there have been multiple studies that support the notion that foreign 
assistance is not effective in aiding in a country’s growth, and often fails to reach the 
poor or to improve the overall quality of life in the country receiving the aid.  Although 
studies have been consistent with these findings, other analysis of foreign assistance 
challenges those views.  
One study, conducted by Burnside and Dollar, does find that aid is a determinant 
of growth.  Burnside and Dollar looked at 56 developing countries from 1970-1993.  
They find that the impact of aid on growth is positive in good policy environments.  They 
find, as did Boon, that aid had no systematic impact on economic policies that affect 
growth.  However, where an increase in aid coincided with good policies, aid had a 
positive relationship with growth (Burnside 2000:32).  
Similar to Burnside and Dollar, Durbarry analyzed 68 developing countries from 
1970-1993.  He also found that foreign aid does have a positive impact on growth, 
however, as suggested by Burnside and Dollar, the positive impact is conditional on a 
strong policy environment.  According to Durbarry, the economic environment of the 
country is an important determinant of growth (Durbarry 1998:17).  Although Durbarry 
found a positive correlation between aid and growth, the study also found that very high 
amounts of aid/GDP ratios are associated with slower growth.  In addition, those 
countries receiving foreign aid that is less than 13 percent of its GDP showed 
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insignificant growth effects (Durbarry 1998:17).  Therefore, the amount of foreign 
assistance/GDP ratio may be associated with how aid impacts the growth rate of the 
recipient country. 
In addition to strong policies, some scholars such as James Gwartney and Robert 
Lawson have found a strong link, not between foreign aid and economic prosperity, but 
between economic freedom and economic prosperity.  Gwartney and Lawson researched 
the level of economic freedom in more than 100 countries from 1975 to 1995.  They 
found that economic freedom positively influenced growth, and that achieving high levels 
of freedom, over time, produced a higher national income level.  When growth occurs, 
Vasquez argues, initial goals to reduce poverty and increase the quality of life are met.  
Therefore, if aid is not used to promote economic freedom, it reduces the probability that 
aid will successfully reach its goals (Vasquez 1998:3).  Making sure recipient countries 
have strong policies that promote economic freedom may be an important component of 
finding a solution to the debate that surrounds the effectiveness of aid. 
Although studies at the macro-level have indicated ambiguous results when 
identifying a relationship between aid and growth, at the micro-level, evaluations of 
foreign aid programs have found that in most cases, aid is effective.  Robert Cassen, 
looks at the impact of aid from a more general perspective.  Instead of testing to see if aid 
is a determinant of growth, he looks at the impact that foreign aid programs may have on 
a recipient country.  According to Cassen, foreign assistance may have a positive impact 
on the country as a whole, through aid supported programs that are targeted to benefit the 
people.  If a foreign aid program can successfully meet the needs of the people, then aid 
has affected the recipient country. 
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After surveying many foreign aid projects, Cassen notes in his book, Does Aid 
Work?, that the performance of aid varies by country, but overall, aid does have a 
positive effect on the recipient country.  According to Cassen, “the great majority of aid 
succeeds in its developmental objectives” (Cassen 1994:9).  He argues that although aid 
programs are not perfect and do not always reach their goals, aid “serves multiple causes” 
and one “should not condemn the entire enterprise” (Cassen 1994:2).  Cassen’s belief that 
aid is effective is derived from the past success of countries receiving foreign assistance.  
For example, The Asian Development Bank evaluated 139 projects in Asia; 97 of 139 
projects were completed successfully (Cassen 1994:8).   
Cassen finds that aid programs have also been successful at decreasing poverty.  
Civilians have indirectly benefited from projects directed toward reducing the cost of 
food in South America, Southeast Asia, and Africa (Cassen 1994:91).  Cassen admits that 
some programs do fail; however, he believes that, overall, aid is effective and should 
continue to be distributed and analyzed.   
According to Durbarry, the reason for the macro-micro paradox is unclear.  
However, each study typically differs in terms of sample size, data quality, and 
econometric technique and specification.  According to Durbarry, studies that test the 
effect of aid on growth, typically do not adequately specify the underlying growth model 
(Durbarry 1998:1).  For example, some studies ignore specific aspects of growth theory 
which involve a more sophisticated empirical analysis.  These are common criticisms of 
aid-growth literature. 
Until more studies indicate that aid is a determining factor of growth, one may be 
inclined to agree with William Easterly who believes that large international aid agencies 
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actually harm the recipient country.  In his article, “The Cartel of Good Intentions,” 
Easterly criticizes the international aid bureaucracy and claims that it will never work 
properly.  His main concern is that the distribution of aid often puts developing countries 
in a prototypical “catch-22” situation.  According to Easterly, developing countries that 
receive aid cannot sufficiently express their needs, nor can they afford to turn the aid 
away.  Therefore, Easterly believes the international aid community operates similar to a 
cartel, for it thrives on customers who have no power to complain or to find alternate 
solutions.  For Easterly, although their intentions may be benevolent, nations involved in 
the “foreign aid business” allow few alternatives for developing countries and are solely 
accountable to themselves (Easterly 2002:40-42). 
Foreign Aid and Failure to Meet Objectives 
Although foreign aid has helped in some circumstances, sometimes, foreign aid 
fails to meet its objectives.  Why is foreign aid successful in some cases, and 
unsuccessful in others?  One reason may be that in many instances, foreign aid attempts 
to accomplish amazing things in very difficult circumstances.  The United States 
constantly tries to implement foreign aid in countries with poor policies and institutions.  
This is risky and is likely to fail from the beginning.  While the primary reason for 
distribution of foreign aid is to promote U.S. objectives and foreign policy, the most 
common reason for failure is the excessive implementation of these policies and the 
motives behind them.  Often times, the interests of the donor prevail over the needs of the 
recipient (Thérien 2000:31). 
Another reason foreign aid programs fail is due to a lack of knowledge about the 
environment or culture in which the program is going to be implemented.  Many of the 
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programs will never succeed because they are not tailored to the needs of the community.  
Communication between donor and recipient is crucial when designing a program funded 
by U.S. foreign aid (Cassen 1994:15).  The World Bank agrees, and strongly advises the 
involvement of local communities in the design and implementation of developing 
projects to solve this problem (World Bank 1998:3). 
Possible Solutions 
 Although foreign aid has been primarily ineffective with respect to overall 
growth, new theories exist that may contribute to success in the future.  For example, the 
World Bank has taken steps to reengineer the way assistance is delivered to developing 
countries, hopefully bringing about long-term change.  Its new objectives are more 
specifically designed to do the following: achieve broad-based economic growth, 
increase democratic activity, stabilize the world population and protect human health, 
protect the environment, and provide humanitarian assistance.  In order to achieve their 
goals, overseas operations have become more “team-oriented.”  These teams have the 
power to make decisions and to manage their activities as needed.  Teams have also 
allowed host-country partners to have an active role in creating new strategies and 
projects (GAO 1997:7).  Hopefully, by giving teams the independence to make needed 
decisions, along with an overall effort to achieve specific goals, USAID programs will 
achieve success that is directly correlated with overall economic growth.  
While it is not exactly clear to what degree foreign aid may influence economic 
growth, studies provide more concise information when it comes to military assistance.  
As mentioned earlier, military assistance sometimes creates leverage that is used to 
manipulate another country.  Although leverage is successful in some situations and 
 14
unsuccessful in others, studies indicate that there are actors that are more likely to 
produce a desired outcome.  According to a study conducted by John Sislin, manipulation 
is more likely to occur if positive sanctions are used instead of negative sanctions.  
Similarly, success is more common among civilian regimes than military regimes.  His 
study also concluded that in the past, as the recipient country acquired more American 
arms, it became more susceptible to U.S. influence (Sislin 1994:680).  Although his study 
gives the data necessary to make a variety of predictions, “it is still not entirely resolved 
why arms influence, succeed or fail” (Sislin1994:682).   
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2. A Historical Overview of U.S. Aid Distribution 
In order to take a closer look at the effectiveness of foreign assistance in 
Colombia, in addition to understanding the importance of foreign assistance in current 
U.S. foreign policy, it is important to examine the most common reasons aid has been 
distributed in the past, along with the most recent objectives of foreign aid.  It is also 
important to examine when foreign aid has been effective in the past, when it has been 
ineffective, and why. 
Early Aid Distribution-Post WWII and Cold War Objectives 
Foreign aid is not a new topic of discussion.  The distribution of U.S. foreign aid 
began following World War II.  Back then, it was primarily allocated to help alleviate 
human suffering, to help rehabilitate and reconstruct damaged infrastructure, and to assist 
in overall recovery throughout the world.  In 1945, under the Bretton Woods agreement, 
the United States partnered with other countries to establish two multilateral 
organizations that still exist, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD, now called the World Bank).  The 
primary responsibility of these organizations is to assist in debt relief and economic 
development as well as to predict creditors’ interests while doing so (Nowels 2004:1).   
Initial allocations of foreign aid went toward war relief (Black 1968:4-5).  
Developing countries began to desire independence and a new way of living that 
appeared nearly impossible to attain.  Without U.S. intervention, they had two choices as 
to how they could achieve their goals. They could either turn to the Soviet bloc for help, 
or turn inwards on their own country, taking the resources they need, while oppressing 
those under their authority (McClellan 1957:13).  In June 1947, the U.S. Secretary of 
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State, General George C. Marshall, introduced a plan that would distribute U.S. aid to 
help lessen hunger, poverty, and chaos in European countries.  Although initial aid was 
distributed more for humanitarian reasons, aid shortly became the prominent tool used by 
the United States to combat the spread of communism (Schraeder 1998:4).  Marshall’s 
plan was the perfect way to help contain the Soviet bloc by strengthening U.S. ties with 
the recipient countries, thus ensuring the protection of U.S. interests during the Cold War 
(Nowels 2004:1).  Overall, the “Marshall Plan” was considered a success because it 
succeeded in these goals.   
Since the Marshall Plan proved to be effective, President Harry Truman 
announced that foreign aid would continue to play an important role in foreign policy.  In 
his inaugural speech, he made it clear that one of his objectives was to give developing 
countries the opportunities they need to achieve their “aspirations of a better life” (Black 
1968:5).  Another objective, called Point Four, was designed to increase the availability 
of technical support offered to other countries.  Truman called Point Four a “bold new 
program” that would allow different programs to help underdeveloped countries use 
available resources to increase their standard of living (Black 1968:14).  Although 
programs were specifically designed to help alleviate suffering in underdeveloped 
countries, aid was being strategically used by the United States to influence international 
policy and the ideology of people in other countries—specifically regarding communism 
(Schraeder 1998:3-5). 
 Although President Truman discussed foreign aid and the importance of aid as a 
component of foreign policy, it was not until 1961 that the United States would establish 
an agency, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), charged with 
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administering foreign aid assistance (Nowels 2005:1).  According to the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961, the use of foreign aid was “to promote foreign policy, security, 
and the general welfare of the United States by assisting people of the world in their 
efforts toward economic development and internal and external security, and for other 
purposes” (Black 1968:14).  During this time, President Kennedy also established the 
Peace Corps.  He encouraged Americans to donate their time and money to help others 
around the world who lived in poverty (Nowels 2004:1). 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s foreign aid expanded beyond Western Europe 
and Japan, and was distributed to U.S. allies in the Middle East, South Asia, and sub-
Saharan Africa. (Nowels 2004:2).  Although aid expanded globally, it did not take long 
for this expansion to be criticized.  In the 1980s, the romanticized idea of using foreign 
aid to help the impoverished countries around the world took a turn for the worse.  
During the Reagan and Bush administrations, aid was “primarily used to promote 
American investment, market economies and national interests, and again, to protect 
other countries from communist influence” (Nowels 2004:2).  However, by the mid-
1980s, the idea of distributing U.S. foreign aid across the world gradually became less 
and less popular.  As the threat of communism began to wane, so did the strategic 
importance of foreign aid.  Furthermore, reports of corruption and misuse of funds in 
foreign countries were often in the news.  This was no surprise to the United States, as it 
had previously funded many violent, repressive regimes, giving them economic and 
military assistance in return for their loyalty during the Cold War.  The United States 
overlooked various violations of international law and made many exceptions for 
“friendly dictators of strategic importance” (Hartmann 2001:9).   
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Foreign Aid and Recent Worldwide Objectives 
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks marked a turning point in the allocation 
of foreign aid.  Foreign aid had always been an important function of U.S. foreign policy; 
however, after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, “U.S. foreign aid (took) on a more strategic 
sense of importance” (Tarnoff 2004:2).  After all, U.S. leaders had to be extremely 
mindful of whether aid packages might ultimately facilitate the ulterior aims of militant 
factions, as well as how the strategic distribution of assets might help to prevent a future 
attack.  As a result, the primary objective for distributing aid remained national security, 
but changed from combating communism to combating terrorism (Brainard 2003:149).   
For example, in September 2002, President George H.W. Bush recognized global 
development, along with defense and diplomacy, to be the top concerns related to U.S. 
national security.  This was the first time in history such emphasis was placed on global 
development, and that emphasis manifested itself in the form of increased foreign aid 
spending.  For instance, Bush promised Afghanistan $4.5 billion and “announced his 
intention to request an increase of $5 billion per year over current foreign assistance 
levels of $12.5 billion through the creation of a bilateral development fund called the 
Millennium Challenge Account (MCA)” (Brainard 2003:149).   
The Millennium Challenge Corporation, an independent government agency, 
allotted new funding to countries with a commitment to “govern justly, invest in people, 
and encourage economic freedom” (Brainard 2003:149).  Its goals also include cutting 
poverty in half by year 2015, improving maternal and child health, increasing literacy 
levels, and combating AIDS and other diseases (Nowels 2004:2).  The underlying 
assumption beneath these objectives was that improving the overall quality of life for 
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citizens in certain parts of the world would ultimately reduce the likelihood of terrorist 
attacks.  
As the threat of terrorism has initiated discussion about foreign aid, the U.S.-Iraq 
war that began in 2003 has highlighted the issue of foreign aid, forcing it into the 
conversations of many Americans.  Since mid-2003, Iraq has received over $20 billion 
for reconstruction activities, and it was the largest aid recipient in FY2004 (Tarnoff 
2004:1-3).  Furthermore, “reconstruction costs in Iraq now exceed all other U.S. foreign 
aid spending, and fighting terrorism is now seen as the leading goal of American foreign 
aid efforts” (Nowels 2004:2).  Although disaster relief has also been at the forefront of 
aid distribution, U.S. assistance in Iraq remains the largest aid initiative since the 
Marshall Plan in 1947 (Nowels 2004:2). 
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3. Past Foreign Assistance and Latin America 
Aid Distribution, Communism, Drugs, and Terrorism 
Similar to the reasons for which U.S. foreign assistance was distributed world-
wide, the United States has given past foreign assistance to Latin America in order to 
prevent Soviet expansion and increase national security.  During the Cold War, the 
United States did whatever was necessary to create allies and influence a country’s stance 
on communism.  It was no secret that the United States distributed foreign assistance to 
many Latin American dictators during the Cold War.  However, as the threat of 
communism subsided, foreign assistance to Latin America switched from combating the 
spread of communism, to fighting the ‘war on drugs.’  In the 1980s, it became obvious 
that countries in Latin America, primarily located in the Andes, were trafficking large 
amounts of drugs into the United States.  As the drug trade became more popular, the 
United States realized the need to take an anti-drug stance and partner with Latin 
America in fighting the drug war.  As a result, U.S. foreign assistance was distributed to 
Latin America in order to meet specific anti-drug objectives.  Although throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, U.S. foreign policy towards Latin America focused on drug eradication 
and interdiction efforts, the events of September 11, 2001 would affect U.S. foreign 
policy toward Latin America, the same way that it did the rest of the world—by shifting 
its focus to combat terrorist activity.       
Latin America and Military Assistance 
Although many types of foreign assistance have been given to Latin America, the 
most common type of foreign assistance given to Latin American countries has come in 
the form of military aid; however, the United States has not always been the primary 
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source of military aid.  Prior to the late-1930s, Latin American countries mainly counted 
on European countries for aid.  For example, Argentina and Bolivia primarily depended 
on Germany, where Peru and Chile depended on France; Italy also contributed to military 
efforts in Latin American countries.  European assistance not only stressed the traditional 
security efforts, but also focused attention on improving engineering and management 
(Baines 1972:471). 
 It was around the late 1930s when the United States began to get involved in 
sending assistance to Latin American countries—primarily in the form of military 
assistance.  During this time, the United States sent several military missions to Latin 
America, thus taking a more active role in establishing military forces in the Western 
Hemisphere.  Shortly thereafter, Latin American countries began to rely heavily on the 
United States as their primary arms supplier; “by 1945, the United States had acquired a 
monopoly in military assistance to Latin America” (Baines 1972:471).  As mentioned, the 
distribution of military assistance to Latin American countries was an extremely 
important tool used by the United States during the Cold War.   
Assistance continued to Latin America in 1951, when the U.S. Congress 
appropriated roughly $40 million in military assistance to Latin American countries 
through the Mutual Security Act of 1951.  This act insisted that countries receiving 
military assistance comply with specific terms and conditions established by the United 
States.  In addition, U.S. military advisers were assigned to each participating country to 
determine specific military requirements.  Although large amounts of aid were distributed 
to Latin American countries, the United States had a direct influence on how the aid was 
being used (Baines 1972:472).  
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 Until the 1950s, assistance to Latin America was primarily used for hemispheric 
defense.  However, the 1960s marked a turning point in the nature of assistance in Latin 
America.  The Kennedy administration “decided to shift the basis of its military policy in 
Latin America from hemispheric defense to internal security, from protection of the 
hemisphere’s coastline and sea lanes, to internal defense of Latin American governments 
against Castro-communist subversion, terrorism, and guerrilla warfare” (Baines 
1972:474).  This shift took the focus off external influence, and emphasized promoting 
internal security.  The logic being, that if the internal security of a nation improved, the 
international threat of that state is likely to decrease. 
 Although the Kennedy administration switched its focus from defense to internal 
security, the threat of the spread of communism was not completely out of the picture.  
Therefore, the United States continued to take precautions.  If, for some reason, 
communism made its way into Latin America, the United States would have continual 
problems knocking at its door.  Ensuring Latin America remained allied to the United 
States was a very important task, and military aid was used to guarantee an anti-
communist stance (Schraeder 1998:5).  The United States wanted Latin American 
countries to be politically, militarily, and economically dependent on the United States.  
This would allow the United States to have a stronger influence in Latin America (Mower 
1979: 146-147).  Investing in the strength of Latin American militaries not only helped 
guarantee an anti-communist stance, but also helped increase security within each 
country.  This was intended to reduce problems at the back door of the United States and 
to provide a system for U.S. influence. 
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 Although the threat of communism was no longer the primary reason for military 
aid distribution, U.S. military aid to Latin America increased in the 1980s and 1990s as 
the drug trade began to surface.  Post-Cold War priorities regarding Latin America 
revolved around international and domestic concerns such as immigration and the drug 
war.  In fact, in his presidential campaign speech, President George H.W. Bush 
announced that the answer to winning the drug war was simple, “…eradicate narcotics at 
their source” (Quoted in Crandall 2001:100).  Therefore, Latin America continued to 
receive military assistance in order to fight the war on drugs.   
All Countries are not Created Equal 
Although total military aid increased to Latin America, distribution has been 
anything but uniform across recipient countries.  This is especially true for countries in 
the Andean region that received U.S. anti-drug money during the 1980s and 1990s.  
Countries such as Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, El Salvador and Honduras received almost all 
of the U.S. military aid, while the remaining 15 countries were left with less than 5% 
(Fitch 1993: 5).   
As Fitch suggests, when considering the fact that only a few countries received 
the majority of military aid distributed to Latin America, increased aid does not seem as 
significant.  This is because while one can see an overall increase of military aid in terms 
of nominal dollars, subtracting prominent recipients from regional totals (most of which 
are located in the Andes) demonstrates a decrease in military aid to Latin America in the 
1970s, an increase in the 1980s, and a greater increase in the 1990s.  Overall, trends of 
military aid to Latin American countries demonstrate the implementation of specific 
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programs designed to carry out various objectives and agendas—but only in specific 
countries (Fitch 1993:1-9).  
Colombia is one of these specific countries that have continued to receive U.S. 
foreign assistance for anti-drug efforts.  In fact, since 1989, Colombia has been the third 
largest recipient of U.S. military aid in the world (Aviles 2001:39).  In order to fully 
understand how foreign assistance has impacted Colombia, it is beneficial to study 
Colombia’s history.  By examining Colombia’s past, one can see how Colombia evolved 
into a weak state, and how its history may affect any recent foreign aid efforts to improve 
its overall condition.  
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4. Colombia-Violence, Guerrillas, and Drugs  
The Early Days 
 It may seem surprising that a country with one of South America’s oldest and 
most durable democracies would have so many current social, economic, and political 
problems.  Apart from being the world’s largest supplier of cocaine, Colombia is known 
as one of the most violent places in the world (Brauer 2004:447).  In addition to having 
the highest number of kidnappings in the world, in the last ten years, Colombia’s 
homicide rate has been among the highest in Latin America (Sarmiento 1997:1).   
Today, Colombia’s violent environment primarily revolves around drug related 
guerrilla activity; however, this has not always been the case.  Colombia’s history shows 
a pattern of violence starting immediately preceding its independence (Hartlyn 1988:21).  
Initially, guerrilla activity emerged in response to Colombia’s political and economic 
conditions.  Guerrillas existed to protect the people, especially the poor.  Over time, 
however, guerrillas became more interested in the thriving drug trade than protecting the 
people.  As a result, they turned inward on the people of Colombia, ironically, attacking 
those they once protected.  As their ties to the drug trade grew, guerrillas increased in 
number and power, eventually exerting more of an influence than the Colombian 
government (Ramsey 1973:2).  When it comes to discussing past or present violence in 
Colombia, one thing is certain; over the years, the Colombian people have suffered dire 
consequences from political upheaval, guerrilla violence, and ongoing drug activity, all of 
which has resulted in a very weak state.  
Although the majority of literature covering the violence in Colombia begins with 
“La Violencia,” violence in Colombia dates back as early as the 1800s.  During the 
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nineteenth century the Colombian population began to identify with either the 
Conservative party or Liberal party.  Party identification became important because once 
a person identified with one party; it became nearly impossible to switch affiliation 
(Hartlyn 1988:16).  Both parties shared opposite views regarding church-state relations.  
The Conservative party allied with the Roman Catholic Church.  In contrast, the Liberal 
party wanted to reduce the power of the church because it believed the influence of the 
church would be detrimental to the intellectual growth of the nation (Ruiz 2001:41).  
Table 1 shows the emergence of the Conservative and Liberal political parties. 1   
After the post-independence conflicts from 1827-1832, seven major civil confrontations 
were fought in the second half of the nineteenth century, while several other small-scale 
conflicts were fought in different regions throughout the country (Hartlyn 1988:21). 
Nineteenth-century violence escalated when conflict regarding President Núñez’ 
political and economic reform led to a brief civil war.  This civil war was preceded by 
one of the greatest and bloodiest civil wars in all of Colombian history, known as the War 
of One Thousand Days (Hartlyn 1988:25).  This three year war was among the country’s 
most intense conflicts, and was fought between the Liberal and Conservative parties.  
John D. Martz explained the political situation during this time: 
The state was the prime regulator, coordinator, and pacesetter of the entire 
national system, the apex of the pyramid from which patronage, wealth, power 
and programs flow.  The form of the government dated back to 1899 and during 
that time no real system of checks and balances existed.  The lack of 
accountability prompted extremist elements of the Conservative party to exploit 
the resources of the government for its political benefit and to exclude the Liberal 
party.  Complicating matters further in 1899, were Liberal allegations of tainted 
elections.  Conservative party repression and denial of executive office to others 
                                                 
1 All tables and figures are located in the Appendices. 
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at all levels increased, and triggered the 1899 War of One Thousand Days (Ruiz 
2001:41). 
 
The Liberal party did its best to assemble together in preparation for war, but it 
was too unorganized.  As a result, it suffered a defeat in Bucaramanga on November 
1899.  Despite the loss, the Liberal party regained what was left, and continued to press 
on, winning the battle of Peralonso the following month.  However, their victory did not 
last long.  Five months later, the Liberals found themselves completely outnumbered by 
the Conservative forces.  Out of sheer necessity, they switched their code of combat from 
one of conventional military tactics to one of guerrilla warfare.  Although the Liberals 
would not gain power, the switch to guerrilla warfare would bring about a new type of 
fighting that would plague the country for the next 100 years (Ruiz 2001:42). 
As a result of the war, approximately 100,000 lives were lost.  Although the war 
had technically ended and the Conservative party had regained power, and violence 
continued throughout the country.  Conflict between the Conservative and Liberal parties 
remained imminent.  In addition, divisions within the governing party often led to partial 
inter-party alliances designed to either promote or discourage political ideas regarding 
ideological issues, regional interest, or personal interest.  Although moderate 
Conservative and Liberal politicians tried to cooperate, a solution could not be 
negotiated.  Extremists from both parties would not allow peace, thus finding ways to 
engender violence for many years after the war (Hartlyn 1988:20).   
In 1904, General Rafael Reyes was elected President.  Despite his efforts to boost 
the economy and curb the conflict, most prominent in the countryside, Reyes had little 
success.  The government was failing to increase industrial growth or to implement 
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strong economic measures; this caused extremists from both parties to become even more 
agitated.  Moreover, the lack of land reform and the absence of adequate working 
conditions for laborers began to spark protests from city to city.  Landowners were being 
attacked by squatters on a regular basis and workers were beginning to organize in 
response to harsh labor conditions (Ruiz 2001:43-44). 
Gradually, workers began to form unions which later led to strikes and riots.  For 
example, major banana, railroad, and field workers began to strike in 1928, causing 
problems for businessmen.  Due to the constant strikes by union workers, General Cortéz 
Vargas was ordered to address the issue.  In order to end the chaos, Vargas began to 
imprison hundreds of union workers.  When the striking workers reacted violently 
towards Vargas and his troops, he ordered his men to kill them and everyone who stood 
by them.  This resulted in the deaths of hundreds (Ruiz 2001:44).  Due to the political 
conflict and constant strikes from union workers, violence became evident from the 
countryside to the cities.   
La Violencia   
 One of the longest armed conflicts and world’s most complicated civil wars of its 
time was known as la violencia (Ramsey 1973:1).  Some scholars date la violencia as far 
back as 1930 when the Liberal party came to power and began to carry out massacres, 
assassinations, and riots against the Conservative party.  Although violence existed 
during this time, it only lasted a year and then subsided until 1946, when chaos broke out 
again-due to the election of Conservative candidate, Mariano Ospina Pérez (Bailey 
1967:565).  Along with his newly acquired title as president came insurrection, rebellion, 
and riots.  Conservatives saw Pérez’ election as an opportunity to enact revenge against 
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Liberals for the violence bestowed on the former in 1930 (Bailey 1967:565).  The Ospina 
government provoked violence as they set out to obtain control over every governmental 
position the Liberals had directed during the past 12 years.  Throughout Ospina’s 
presidency, his rule became more oppressive against the Liberals.  He banned all public 
meetings and fired all the Liberal governors.  He did everything he could to intimidate 
and harass members of the Liberal party (Ruiz 2001:51).   
As violence began to escalate, certain techniques of torture became so 
commonplace that they were given names.  Among these were picar para tamal, which 
consisted of cutting up the body of a living victim into small pieces.  Other techniques 
included inflicting small puncture wounds all over the body, causing the body to bleed to 
death.  Men and women throughout Colombia were crucified, hung, and raped.  Luiz 
López de Mesa, an astute commentator, wrote this, regarding la violencia,  
…all nations of the Earth have shown cruelty as horrible and destructive as 
ours…But I find in our ethical situation an element and a refinement of horror 
unknown in the world, because the cruelty was applied, not to adversaries or 
possible rivals, but to brothers, equal in situation, or even more humble and 
innocent (Bailey 1967:563). 
 
Just when Colombians believed things could not get any worse, violence spiked as a 
major riot broke out in Colombia’s capital. 
El Bogotazo 
In 1948, the assassination of former presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán 
intensified la violencia.  Gaitán was a man with a proven track record for defending the 
poor, and was one of Colombia’s most important politicians.  Gaitán attempted to bring 
the country together and to give all people equal standing in the eyes of the law.  He 
advocated an eight-hour working day, accident and health insurance, paid holidays and 
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protection for women and children.  Over the years, he gained much popularity as the 
governor of Bogotá (Ruiz 2001:44-48).     
Although Gaitán was liked by many, there were those who despised his views and 
blamed him for all the violence that was occurring in the countryside.  Every day and 
every night, violence broke out in rural areas of the country as one political party raided 
the other.  As the population suddenly began to grow in the cities, it was obvious to 
everyone the degree of violence occurring in the countryside.  Politicians and other elites 
heard numerous accounts of the violence but they chose to ignore it.  However, this 
would change on April 9, 1948, when Gaitán was assassinated in Bogotá.  This event, 
known as El Bogotazo, was one of the darkest days of Colombian history and recorded as 
the greatest riot in the Western Hemisphere (Ruiz 2001: 55).   
During El Bogotazo, the entire city was completely destroyed.  Multiple buildings 
in Bogotá were ruined, including many churches that were set on fire.  Fidel Castro 
witnessed the riot, describing it as a state of indescribable rage with “crazed people 
running…with an indescribable fear in their eyes” (Cited in Ruiz 2001:56).  Due to the 
chaos, Castro later fled to the Cuban embassy.   
Later that night, the rain was heavy, and the fires began to go out.  In spite of the 
rain which was preventing the entire city from burning to the ground, violence spread 
throughout the country and continued for the next ten years (Ruiz 2001:55-56). 
La Violencia Continues 
As a result of Ospina’s intimidation tactics and the events that occurred during El 
Bogotazo, no one ran for the Liberal party in the 1950 elections.  Therefore, Conservative 
candidate Loreano Gómez was elected president.  Gómez ruled with absolute authority 
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and ran a very repressive regime.  It was because of this that he was given the nickname 
El Monstruo.  A former priest named Walter J. Broderick recorded the terror inflicted on 
Colombia by the newly-elected Gómez administration: 
My eyes have seen many sights.  I have seen men coming into the cities 
mutilated, women raped, children flogged and wounded.  I saw a man whose 
tongue had been cut out, and people who were lashed to a tree and made to 
witness the cruel scene told me that the policemen yelled as they cut out his 
tongue: You won’t be giving any more cheers for the Liberal party, you bastard! 
They cut genitals off other men so they wouldn’t procreate any more 
Liberals…And I know men who where held bound while policemen and 
conservative civilians took it in turns to rape their wives and daughters.  
Everything was carried out according to a preconceive plan of extermination.  
And the victims of these bloodthirsty policemen were poor, humble country 
people who were members of the Liberal party.  Their wives, their old folk and 
their children where shot in the full light of day (Quoted in Ruiz 2001). 
 
In response to the violence inflicted on them, Liberals began to organize in hopes 
of defending themselves against the Conservatives.  Guerrilla bands were being formed 
to provide protection and harassed authorities and other Conservatives in power (Bailey 
1967:566).  During this time, the rise in guerrilla groups reflected the need for protection.  
However, guerrilla groups would later turn from their responsibilities and pursue other 
objectives that would have devastating consequences. 
In 1953, after stepping aside due to illness, Goméz was replaced by a military 
coup that hoped to end the country’s chaos.  General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, head of the 
armed forces, came aboard to end the violence.  The decision to allow the military to 
have authority was part of conservative strategy.  They wanted to use the military to calm 
the violence and then to regain power after peace had been restored (Sarmiento 1997:2-
3).  Pinilla’s initial success helped him gain popularity and as a result, the national 
assembly elected him to a full four-year presidential term in 1954.  However, his inability 
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to end la violencia led to a nationwide general strike, and by 1957, Rojas Pinilla was on 
his way out (Brauer 2004:454).  
The National Front 
With the help of society, political leadership overthrew Pinilla and sent him into 
exile.  In place of Pinilla, a temporary military junta assumed power.  In 1958, an effort 
was made by both parties to curb the political violence.  As a result, the Liberal and 
Conservative parties agreed to amend the constitution and to alternate the presidency 
every four years.  The two parties shared all bureaucratic and legislative positions until 
1974 (Von Der Walde 2001:1).  This agreement, known as the National Front, brought an 
end to the period known as la violencia.  Although la violencia concluded, the overall 
situation in Colombia remained the same.  Upon analyzing this time period, Daniel 
Pécaut observes: 
La Violencia begins with the will to maintain or reestablish the political order, it 
proceeds with a combination of offensive and defensive strategies, it concludes 
leaving an apparently unchanged landscape, created for the same social structures, 
the same partisan allegiances, the same precarious central state…Everything goes 
on as if nothing had happened…communicating the feeling of a mere interruption 
of the ordinary course of the oligarchic democracy.  Such is the conviction of the 
socio-economic elite… (Cited in Garcés 2005:5).   
 
La violencia may have technically concluded, but its effects were still fresh in the minds 
of everyone.  Not much had changed.  The violence had not ceased and the Colombian 
government could still not battle opposition. 
Although the Liberal and Conservative parties both approved the National Front, 
neither party wanted to lose power to the other party or to the military.  In addition, those 
Colombians who did not feel represented by the National Front, predominantly the poor, 
became extremely frustrated with the newly-designed agreement that favored the elite 
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and reinforced inequality.  The combination of governmental repression, a lack of 
political and electoral democracy, and extreme poverty, led to the formation of a violent 
guerrilla movement during the 1970s and 1980s.  These groups primarily consisted of 
individuals who thought they could change the economic and social situation with the use 
of outright violence (Sarmiento 1997:2).  Overall, the National Front was not considered 
successful in ending violence in Colombia; instead, one could say that it provoked even 
more division within the nation, in turn causing more problems and potential for future 
violence. 
Guerrilla Groups and Drug Activity Popularize   
As previously mentioned, guerrilla groups originally emerged in response to the 
economic and political situation within Colombia.  Illegally-armed groups began to 
appear in areas of the Andes which were geographically difficult for the government to 
control.  In 1966, communist and common liberals came together to formally establish 
the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC).  Shortly thereafter, the 
Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) emerged with pro-Castro, Cuban-style ideology 
(Von Der Walde 2001:2).  During this time, several other groups were formed, such as 
the Popular Liberation Army (EPL), influenced by Maoist philosophy, and the People’s 
United Front, lead by Camilo Torres (Von Der Walde 2001:2).    
During the 1970s even more guerrilla groups surfaced.  These groups included an 
urban guerrilla group called the M-19, an indigenous guerrilla group, Quintin Lame, the 
Worker’s Self Defense (ADO), and the Worker’s Revolutionary Party (PRT) (Watson 
1990:2-3).   
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The 1970s not only marked a turning point in guerrilla activity, but also in illegal 
drug activity.  In the 1970s, Colombia became known as one of the major producers of 
cannabis.  Production of cannabis would begin to decrease over the years, but would be 
replaced by other illegal drugs, such as cocaine, opium, and heroin (UNODC 2003:2).    
As drugs and guerillas increasingly emerged, revolutionary activity was bound to occur.  
For example, in 1979 the M-19 guerrilla groups seized the embassy of the Dominican 
Republic in Bogotá and held thirteen ambassadors hostage.  Terrorist attacks such as this 
became commonplace.   
In response to the violence, President Belisario Betancur Cuartas initiated a peace 
process and entered a ceasefire with the guerrillas in 1982.  He offered a general amnesty 
plan for all armed guerrillas that would turn themselves in.  Although the peace process 
brought about some success to end guerrilla activity, by the end of the 1980s, terrorist 
attacks had escalated.  Three presidential candidates had been murdered along with 
eleven Supreme Court justices.  Also, “more than 2,000 militants of one political party, 
many of whom were former guerrillas, were systematically murdered” (Sarmiento 
1997:5).  Journalists, judges, ministers, an attorney general, soldiers, policemen, and 
thousands of citizens perished due to the wave of violence in Colombia.  Ironically, 
despite these violent guerrilla actions, illegal guerrilla groups received support from 
religious leaders who were fed up with the government’s inability to increase the quality 
of life for the Colombian people (Sarmiento 1997:3).     
 Guerilla groups were not the only threat to the Colombian people and the state.  In 
fact, a 1964 civil defense law allowed Colombian defense units to rise up and help the 
Colombian military battle the guerrillas.  These groups, called paramilitares, were 
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composed of private security forces funded by landowners and businessmen.  These 
groups initially sided with the Colombian armed forces and even received financial 
support for their help.  However, soon after they began to organize, the Colombian 
government ceased to formally work with them and even labeled the groups as “illegally 
armed forces.”  Over time, paramilitary groups came together under an umbrella 
organization called the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).  The AUC would later 
be guilty of carrying out large-scale massacres of defenseless peasants, creating death 
squads, and becoming highly involved in the drug trade (Rabasa 2001:53-56).     
By the mid-1980s, Colombia was completely divided and violence was at an all 
time high.  Murders and desaparecidos were the outcome of a lack of security in rural 
and urban areas.  Along with an increase of violence, there was a heightened concern 
regarding insurgencies that were supported by Cuba.  More importantly, drug trafficking 
had surfaced and was steadily becoming more of a problem.  Division among the nation 
resulted in a weak state and a powerless military (Sarmiento 1997:5). 
By the late 1980s and early 1990s peace agreements led some groups such as the 
EPL, PRT, M-19, and Quintín Lame to lay down their arms and stop the majority of their 
violence.  Although certain guerrilla groups disarmed and reintegrated into society, other 
groups grew in number.  At this point in history, guerrilla groups no longer existed to 
protect the people from the government, instead, they exploited civilians who owned 
large amounts of land and kidnapped relatives of wealthy businessmen in return for 
ransom money.  In addition to ransom money, guerrillas began to develop ties to the drug 
trade and charged narco-traffickers for the protection they provided.  As these ties to the 
drug trade increased, so did the number of guerrilla members and the power they wielded. 
 36
Drug money would become an essential part of the livelihood of their organizations and 
would give them the boost they needed to threaten the entire state (Garcés 2005:8). 
Guerrilla Activity in Recent Years 
Today, due to their ability to organize and generate finances, three groups still 
influence the ongoing civil conflict in Colombia.  These organizations include Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN), 
and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC).  These groups have been responsible 
for multiple terrorist attacks on innocent civilians, political figures, and even Colombia’s 
infrastructure.  They are also responsible for nearly all kidnappings and “desaparecidos” 
throughout Colombia (Simons 2003:2). 
  The most influential and powerful guerilla organization is the FARC.  The 
FARC expanded slowly between the mid-1960s and 1980s.  In the beginning, the FARC 
guerillas ambushed military units and raided farms to capture equipment.  In 1969, the 
FARC continued to expand, establishing seven different fronts—that is a geographic 
jurisdiction that contains specific areas of operation.  Each jurisdiction contains “combat, 
support, and infrastructure elements” (Rabasa 2001:24-26).  At the core of the front is the 
combat unit, consisting of a few hundred people.  Besides the combat units, there are 
logistics commissions, intelligence commissions, public order commissions, and mass 
work commissions—all staffed by militia members (Rabasa 2001:26).   
Over time, fronts continued to evolve throughout the country.  The FARC grew 
from 350 fighters in 1966 to approximately 20,000 in 2000 (Rabasa 2001:26-27).  This 
rapid growth can be attributed to ties with the drug trade.  Today, FARC is the most 
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influential and powerful guerrilla group in Colombia, as they have militia members 
located throughout the country in every social sector (Rabasa 2001:27).    
Another organization that is still a threat to Colombian society is the ELN, 
formally founded in 1964.  The ELN was initially composed of students and graduates of 
the University of Santander.  Their initial operations were small and generally ineffective.  
This was due to their inability to organize, in addition to a division in ideology.  In the 
late 1960s, the army received enough information regarding ELN members, to capture or 
kill many of its members, nearly resulting in the organization’s downfall.  However, in 
the 1980s the ELN reemerged under the leadership of Manuel Pérez.  Its numbers grew 
from 800 in 1986 to 3,000 in 1996.  By 2000, the ELN had an estimated 5,000 members.  
The ELN, although focused on influencing the Colombian oil industry, often encounters 
conflict over territory with the FARC and paramilitary organizations—conflict that 
usually results in violence (Rabasa 2001:30-31).  
  Finally, the paramilitaries or AUC have been a major ingredient in the overall 
problem of violence in Colombia.  In the 1980s, links were established between 
paramilitary organizations and various crime related activity, including drug-trafficking.  
Initially, the paramilitaries were not as powerful as the FARC or ELN, due to their 
inability to effectively organize.  However, over time, many paramilitary self-defense 
groups assembled under one umbrella organization called the AUC (Autodefensas Unidas 
de Colombia).  This gave them more organization and more influence.  Strategies of the 
AUC were very similar to those of the guerrillas.  Its main objective was to destroy the 
existing control of drug-producing areas where guerilla groups were so prevalent.  During 
the late 1990s, it was estimated that the AUC had approximately 8,000 fighters. 
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Colombia also had many other self-defense groups that were not associated with the 
AUC, but still threatened the country’s stability.  Together, they were responsible for 
many reported executions of guerilla sympathizers and mass killings in villages that 
allegedly assist guerilla groups (Rabasa 2001:53-56).  
Today, there has been significant success in negotiating with the AUC.  The AUC 
has begun a demobilization process and is increasingly laying down arms.  Members 
have stated that with the increase in Colombia’s armed forces and military activity, their 
efforts may no longer be necessary.  However, AUC leader Carlos Castano recently 
claimed that 70% of the AUC’s funding comes from the drug trade.  Therefore, even as 
the AUC participates in the demobilization process, its ties to the drug trade have 
remained unchanged.     
 There are various ways in which the guerrilla organizations and the paramilitary 
groups fund their activity.  Before the drug trade surfaced, the guerrilla groups made most 
of their income from kidnappings and “revolutionary taxes.”  Kidnappings also occur 
today, and still serve as one of the major sources of revenue for both the FARC and the 
ELN.  In the first half of 2000, for example, 1,559 people were kidnapped, including 126 
children.  The majority of the victims were cattle ranchers, farmers, and merchants that 
lived in the countryside.  However, kidnappings are also a concern for those that live in 
cities.  This is especially true for business people who are often targeted and fall victim to 
this profit-motivated crime.  Typically, successful businessmen or landowners are most 
vulnerable because they have exactly what guerillas need—land and money (Rabasa 
2001:32-33).   
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Although kidnappings are predominantly used to generate ransom money, they 
are also used for propaganda purposes—to intimidate political and civil leaders.  Low-
level political figures, such as mayors, are especially susceptible to this threat.  In fact, 
there have been some cases in which guerrillas have taken control over local 
governments and have used local money to fund their own guerrilla operations (Rabasa 
2001:32-33). 
 Currently however, the most efficient way for guerrillas to fund their 
organizations is through drug-related activity.  Drug-traffickers use several different ways 
and routes to grow, process, and export illegal drugs.  They also operate via the internet 
and cellular phones, using the newest technology available.  Traffickers need protection 
and arms.  This is where the link is made between drug trafficking and guerrilla groups.  
Guerrillas are given large sums of drug money in exchange for protection and other 
services.  For example, the FARC has a precise schedule of fees.  In 1999, FARC fees in 
(U.S. dollars) were as follows: production of basic paste, $15.70 per kilo; chlorhydrate of 
cocaine, $52.60 per kilo; protection of laboratories, $5,263 each; protection of coca 
fields, $52.60 per hectare; protection of poppy fields, $4,210 per hectare; security of 
landing strips, $2,631 each; cocaine shipments, $10.50 per kilo; river transportation of 
precursor chemicals, 20% of shipment value; international drug flights, $5,263 each; and 
domestic drug flights, $2,631 each (Rabasa 2001:32-33).   
Although the FARC is most predominantly involved with trafficking, the ELN 
and the AUC have also been linked to drug activity.  In March 2000, the Colombian 
armed forces released numbers that demonstrate drug activity among all groups.  Out of 
61 total FARC units, 32 were linked to the drug trade; out of 41 total ELN units, 7 were 
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linked to the drug trade; and out of 19 AUC units, 8 were linked to the drug trade (Rabasa 
2001:33).  Overall, guerrilla participation with the illegal drug trade has hurt the 
Colombian people, weakened the state, and has hindered Colombian foreign relations—at 
times, even with the United States.     Due to Colombia’s history of violence and drugs, it 
has continued to receive foreign assistance in order to assist in the stability of the country. 
 41
5. Past Foreign Assistance and Colombia 
International Influences 
 During the 1960s and 1970s, Colombia was one of the major Latin American 
recipients of international foreign aid from organizations such as USAID, the World 
Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank (Cassen 1994:252).  International 
assistance programs designed to improve the social and economic development of 
Colombia seemed to have a significant impact on the country’s employment rate, poverty 
level, and overall growth.  The majority of assistance went to build infrastructure, 
improve agriculture, and expand educational opportunities.  Foreign assistance seemed to 
improve the standards of living for many poor Colombians.  As a result, Colombia was 
considered a success story and “showcase” for the Alliance for Progress program during 
its time (Cassen 1994:253).   
 Just as Colombia was showing great signs of economic improvement, its economy 
suffered from the economic recession and debt crisis that affected all of Latin America in 
the early 1980s.  Although Colombia’s economy suffered because of the recession, 
compared to other Latin American countries, Colombia was considered economically 
stable as it averaged annual growth rates around 3.3 percent of the gross domestic 
product going into the 1990s (Aviles 2001:36). 
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Colombia During the 1980s and 1990s 
Although Colombia had received economic assistance from organizations such as 
USAID and the World Bank, beginning with the 1980s, the United States would begin to 
increase its distribution of military assistance to Colombia as the drug trade became more 
popular.  By the mid 1980s, concerns regarding Colombia’s influence on the U.S. drug 
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problem were at the forefront of the media, and drug abuse was evolving into one of the 
largest areas of concern for the general public.  In fact, a New York Times poll published 
in 1988 reported that 48 percent of the U.S. public thought that the drug war was the most 
difficult challenge that the United States was facing in post-Cold War policy (Crandall 
2001:98).   
U.S. President H.W. George Bush recognized the heightening concerns of the 
public and began to explore the most efficient way to address this ‘drug problem.’  
However, in August 1989, Colombia’s Liberal party presidential candidate, Luis Carlos 
Galán was assassinated.  His killing opened the eyes of U.S. government officials to the 
severity of Colombia’s problems.  As a result of his death, the United States sent an 
additional $65 million in counter-narcotics assistance to Colombia, almost six times the 
original amount allotted for 1989 (Crandall 2001:101).  
 A month later, President Bush announced a $2.2 billion foreign assistance plan 
designed to increase eradication and interdiction efforts in the Andes—specifically 
targeting Colombia.  This initiative made the Andes the leading recipient of U.S. military 
assistance in the Western Hemisphere; however, in 1990 the United States turned its 
attention from the drug war and focused on the Persian Gulf War.  In addition, in 1993 
President Clinton reduced anti-narcotics assistance both domestically and internationally.  
However, his attempt to decrease funding would not last long.  In 1994 after mid-term 
elections, the Republican party took over Congress—thus turning its attention back onto 
anti-narcotics efforts.  Specifically, the United States gradually became obsessed with 
Colombia’s drug problem due to the newly elected Colombian president, Ernesto Samper 
(1994-1998).  Due to his ties to multiple drug cartels, Samper lost all credibility and 
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respect from the United States.  During his time as president, Samper established one of 
the most abrasive U.S.-Colombian relationships in U.S.-Latin American history (Crandall 
2001:101).   
President Pastrana 
The election of President Andrés Pastrana in 1998 created an opportunity for 
productive U.S.-Colombian dialogue to be restored.  Pastrana entered office anxious to 
move forward in the peace process and appeared to be very dedicated to playing the role 
of peacemaker; he seemed especially eager to enter into peace negotiations with guerrilla 
groups.  For example, in 1997, he offered the FARC a “distension zone” which consisted 
of 42,000 km2 of land.  The United States supported Pastrana’s efforts, and initiated 
further peace discussions between United States officials and FARC officials in Costa 
Rica.  Although Pastrana’s intentions to negotiate with FARC were legitimate, his 
decision to give them their own territory was a huge mistake.  The FARC instantly turned 
the area into a mini-state and created its own justice system, infrastructure, and school 
system.  In addition, the FARC began training approximately 18,000 guerillas in this 
area.  The FARC was building its own army, and peace negotiations were going nowhere 
(UNODC 2003:6-7).   
Since negotiations remained stagnant, the Pastrana administration decided to take 
the land back.  In February, the armed forces seized land previously given to the FARC, 
and the guerrillas were forced to flee to rural areas which they had previously lived.  
Shortly after the FARC’s retrieval from the “distension zone,” an increase of terrorist 
attacks—such as bombings and assassinations—began to break out not only against the 
Colombian people, but also against the U.S. citizens living in Colombia.  For instance, in 
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1999, the FARC deliberately murdered three American indigenous-rights activists who 
lived in Colombia.  This ended any additional discussion between the United States and 
FARC, and gave U.S. officials a first-hand look at what Colombians had endured for 
decades (Sweig 2002:1). 
After struggling to fight the rich, powerful, guerrilla organizations, Pastrana 
turned to the United States for assistance.  As a result, in 2000, the United States would 
become a major actor, in conjunction with Colombian officials, in the battle to win the 
“war on drugs” (Sarmiento 1997:6).   
Pastrana had about as much success negotiating peace with the FARC as the 
United States had, and his peace efforts would continue to flounder in the midst of civil 
turmoil (Ruiz 2001:226).  The people, sick and tired of all the bloodshed, flooded the 
streets of Colombia.  On Sunday, October 24, 1999, wearing white shirts with green 
ribbons, Colombians protested by waving white flags in the air and screaming “No Más” 
(or “No More”).  The people longed for the kidnappings, murders, and massacres to end.  
The protest aired on every news station in Colombia, as approximately six million 
people, in seventeen different cities across the nation, took part.  Protesters believed that 
this was the only way they could pressure the government to do something about the 
violence.  As a result, thirteen governmental officials and twelve FARC delegates began 
reviewing a 12 point negotiation program.  The program called for the “disarmament of 
the guerrillas in return for sweeping reforms to ease poverty, redistribute land to peasants 
and combat political corruption” (Ruiz 2001:228).  The FARC threw in a few stipulations 
of its own, demanding governmental armed forces be withdrawn from the southern 
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border of Ecuador all the way north to Bogotá.  The government was not about hand over 
such territory.  Therefore, no such concession was made (Ruiz 2001: 227-228).  
Although Pastrana seemed devoted the peace, there was little hope that he would 
reach any type of peace agreement with the FARC.  Those assumptions were correct.  On 
November 2, when negotiations were scheduled to resume, FARC representatives failed 
to even show up.  This reflected poorly on Pastrana, because it showed the lack of respect 
the FARC had for him and his administration.  Local polls showed that close to 80 
percent of Colombians believed Pastrana was not dealing with the peace negotiations 
properly.  Pastrana felt he had no choice but to turn to foreign troops for help.  Many of 
the top businessmen agreed with Pastrana, and believed this was the only way to stop the 
guerrillas.  Others disagreed and wore shirts that said “No More Gringo Military.”  This 
was a direct commentary on the U.S. military aid already being used by the Colombian 
government in an attempt to decrease narcotics-trafficking (Ruiz 2001: 228-229). 
At this point, the United States had heightened concerns regarding the problems 
in Colombia.  The lack of cooperation from the FARC alarmed the U.S., and caused its 
officials to consider increasing involvement in Colombia.  Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright, for one, explained how the guerrilla groups were funding their operations with 
drug money, and how this problem was affecting many other nations.  She concluded that 
“Colombia’s people are engaged in a vital test of democracy…they should know that we 
understand the many dimensions and long-term nature of the problems they face, and that 
we will do all we can to help them” (Ruiz 2001:228-229).  Many agreed with Albright 
and were concerned that Colombia was losing the battle to the guerrillas.  Others saw the 
need for more assistance to Colombia to fight the drug war.  For instance, Indiana 
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Representative, Dan Burton stated, “This is our war as much as Colombia’s War…The 
billions we’re talking about for dealing with the drug problem down there is not enough” 
(Ruiz 2001: 230).  Dennis Hastert of Illinois declared, “I think the oldest democracy in 
the Southern Hemisphere is in great jeopardy…I’m concerned about Colombia because 
of the implications it has for our kids…the heroin and cocaine that comes into our 
country” (Ruiz 2001:232).    
Although there were many who agreed with these politicians, there were others 
who believed further involvement in Colombia would be a disaster.  One senior official, 
who once worked in Colombia, and who disagreed with any further U.S. involvement 
stated that, “It (the situation in Colombia) is going to be a very dangerous mess…and we 
(the United States) are going to be in the middle of that mess” (Ruiz 2001: 229).   
In September 1999, Pastrana made a visit to the United States, on behalf of 
Colombia, to ask for an increase in aid.  He requested $3.5 billion over a three year 
period, in the form of military equipment, technical support, and intelligence assistance.  
Democrats insisted that Pastrana improve the human rights situation in Colombia before 
receiving more aid from the United States.  Pastrana pleaded with the United States to 
eliminate restraints on aid because of Colombia’s human rights record.  He claimed that 
Colombia’s poor human rights record was due to the impact of the existing guerrilla 
organizations, which he needed assistance in combating.  
Despite strong reservations, Congress began examining a new aid package 
proposed by Republican Senators Paul Coverdell and Mike DeWine.  This package 
allotted for $1.5 billion over a three year period, with $540 million for helicopters and 
other equipment, $405 million to enhance drug interdiction, $120 million to develop 
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alternative opportunities to grow drug crops in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru, and $70 
million to strengthen democracy and human rights.  Pastrana was pleased with this 
package, but despite his approval, there was too much debate within the Congress, and 
the package did not pass (Ruiz 2001:233-234).  
Albright called Pastrana soon thereafter to reassure him that the United States had 
not betrayed him.  She guaranteed that President Clinton would ask Congress to increase 
aid early the next year.  Meanwhile, Pastrana’s job as president was becoming more 
difficult.  Amnesty International testified that they would oppose any additional military 
aid to Colombia.  The organization saw no improvement in Colombia’s horrific human 
rights record despite the fact that Colombia was already receiving aid from the United 
States.  Susan Lee, Amnesty’s researcher on Colombia found shocking evidence of poor 
human rights records when she visited that country.  She observed that “killings have 
been conducted with chain saws, victims have been dismembered alive…There are 
reports of paramilitaries playing football with victims’ heads” (Ruiz 2001:235).   
Not only did it seem that Pastrana was losing international support, but two of his 
top generals, Fernando Tapias and Jorge Mora, resigned in November.  Both men were 
frustrated with the United States and did not believe Pastrana and Ricardo (Pastrana’s 
right hand man), were being dynamic enough.  Tapias and Mora wanted Ricardo out of 
the picture, but Pastrana could not consent.  Pastrana and Ricardo were controlling the 
peace process and if Ricardo was fired, it would appear that Pastrana was ending the 
peace process.  Luckily, in the end, Pastrana refused to accept Tapias’ and Mora’s 
resignation, and talked them into staying on board.  In return, Pastrana “abandoned the 
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language of a peacemaker and adopted a more bellicose tone” to appease them (Ruiz 
2001:237).   
Plan Colombia 
In December 1999, violence in Colombia reached new heights.  Year end 
statistics in 1999 reflected the increase in violence and total chaos.  A total of 1,863 
Colombians were massacred and approximately 90 percent of all crimes went 
unpunished.  Colombia was in desperate need of help and Pastrana knew it.  He began 
designing a five-year plan, one intended to assist development, rebuild the judiciary, and 
implement crop substitution and coca eradication.  Also, the plan aimed at assisting 
people who had been displaced from their homes.  More specifically, objectives included 
the following: support for human rights and judicial reform, the expansion of counter- 
narcotics operations in southern Colombia (in the form of helicopters, humanitarian 
assistance, and developmental assistance), an increase in alternative economic 
development for Colombia, Bolivia, and Ecuador, increased interdiction efforts, and 
assistance for the Colombian police. 
Pastrana called this “Plan Colombia,” and once again turned to the United States 
for assistance.  Beyond that, he also looked to Europe and the international community 
for help.  The original five-year plan called for a total contribution of $7.5 billion, with 
$4 billion provided by Colombia, $1.3 billion provided by the United States, and the rest 
provided by Europe (Marcella 2003:19).  
 Plan Colombia was heavily-debated and controversial from the beginning.  
Congressmen were concerned that the United States was getting in over its head, and 
many were concerned that the United States could not have a significant impact in 
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Colombia without getting deeply involved in that country’s ongoing civil war.  In 
addition, there were still concerns about Colombia’s human rights violations and its ties 
with illegal armed forces.   
Overall, Congress did not feel that Colombia’s human rights record should be 
overlooked (Sweig 2002: 3-9).  Those who did not want to support Plan Colombia also 
saw parallels to the Vietnam War.  They believed assistance would provoke more 
violence and would increase refugee flows.  There were even concerns as to techniques 
related to assisting Colombia in this war on drugs—especially regarding herbicide 
fumigation.  This particular controversy centered on the health of those exposed to the 
herbicides, as “aerial eradication (had) caused eye, respirator, skin, and digestive 
ailments” (Morris 2001:1-3).   
  Colombia’s ambassador was one of the major, influential people in the process 
of lobbying U.S. officials for aid.  Luis Alberto Moreno met with hundreds of members 
of Congress, and he expressed, in detail, the need for assistance and the good intentions 
of its rulers.  Further, as Sweig notes, “Bogotá also brought dozens of U.S. legislators and 
their staffs to Colombia for carefully packaged tours.  Embassy officials worked in the 
halls of the U.S. executive branch, toured the salons of Washington think tanks, and 
crisscrossed party lines” (Sweig 2002:1).   
In 2000, Congress waived Colombia’s human rights requirement, and allotted 
$1.3 billion towards Plan Colombia, with two-thirds of the money set aside for military 
purchases (McLean 2002: 133).  The United States was adamant about its commitment to 
counter-narcotics operations, force protection, and eradication of coca fields, lab 
destruction, and if necessary, humanitarian assistance (Marcella 2003:19-20).  In addition 
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to providing helicopters and other equipment, intelligence and other military assistance, 
Plan Colombia included training by U.S. special forces (Economist 2003:1).  Congress, 
aware of Colombia’s poor human rights record and ties with guerrilla groups, insisted 
that all Colombians trained by U.S. officials have a clear understanding of the 
expectations regarding human rights standards.  The United States also granted Colombia 
electronic surveillance equipment, which enabled the latter to keep an eye on the 
relationship between paramilitaries and the Colombian military (Sweig 2003:1).   
Although the United States agreed to partner in Plan Colombia, Pastrana did not 
receive the international support he wanted.  Most Europeans refused to contribute to 
Plan Colombia, as they were unwilling to ignore the country’s terrible human rights 
record.  Beyond that, many in the international community declined the opportunity to 
take part in Plan Colombia because they perceived the plan’s approach as geared more 
toward improving the military—instead of toward precipitating social reform (Falcoff 
2002:2).  However, despite the lack of support internationally, Pastrana was pleased.  He 
knew that the support he received from the United States would be a great start towards 
achieving his objectives (Ruiz 2001: 248).   
Although Pastrana was excited about U.S. help, not everyone was thrilled about 
the aid Colombia was receiving—especially Colombian locals involved in the drug trade.  
After being informed of Congress’ decision to cooperate with Plan Colombia, Sureshot, 
the leader of FARC, expressed his views on U.S. intervention: 
What we have here is hunger, misery and exploitation and that’s not going to end 
with rifles, machine guns or bombs.  I think the ones who came up with this [aid] 
agreement have committed a grave error.  The problems here are social order, it’s 
not a problem of weaponry.  The FARC disagrees with this aid from the U.S. 
because assistance should be for social spending and peace, not for increasing the 
 51
conflict with the blessing of the few who directly benefit from the war.  We can 
be attacked by the security forces when the President considers it convenient since 
we are an organization that has taken up arms against the state.  But it’s wrong 
that they should do this with the participation of the U.S., under the slanderous 
pretext that we have links to the drug trade (Ruiz 2001: 248). 
 
It was obvious, Sureshot realized, that the FARC was the number one target of the 
Colombian military, and now the military had major support from the United States—
whose government had evidence of FARC members guarding illegal crops, providing 
security for drug labs, and engaging in other activity to aid in the drug trade.  (According 
to the DEA, for example, the FARC generated a large financial alliance with the drug 
trade that generated about $2 million a day).  Although the FARC tried to downplay its 
illegal activity and to create the illusion that it represented the best interests of poor 
Colombians, everyone knew better, especially the U.S. government (Ruiz 2001: 248).  
The demolition of the FARC organization has been, and will continue to be the primary 
target of the Colombian-U.S. initiative. 
The Impact of September 11, 2001 
While Plan Colombia was operating in its second year, the international 
community was sidetracked by the events of September 11, 2001.  These events would 
drastically impact U.S. international policy, and more specifically, would affect U.S. 
policy toward Colombia.  Primarily, after 9/11, the U.S. shifted its priority from counter-
narcotics to counterterrorism.  However, this did not let guerrilla groups off the hook, 
because the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC already appeared on the U.S. State 
Department’s list of terrorist organizations.  Although none of the groups had all the 
characteristics of a classical international terrorist organization, and though Colombia 
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was never formally made part of the global ‘war on terror,’ guerrilla organizations in 
Colombia were now targeted more than they had ever been (Cope 2002:3). 
However, this subtle shift in their U.S. classification (which went from describing 
them as narcotics groups to terrorist groups) did not stop guerrilla organizations from 
continuing their horrific crimes.  As a result, Pastrana offered one last effort to negotiate 
peace in Colombia with the FARC.  No agreement ensued, and a month later, the FARC 
conducted approximately 170 armed attacks in a thirty-day span.  On February 20, 2002, 
the FARC hijacked a civilian aircraft and kidnapped one passenger, Senator Jorge 
Eduardo Gechem Turbay (Marcella 2003:21-22).    He was the head of the Senate 
Commission on Peace, and a member of a large political family.   
Subsequently, Pastrana formally declared that he was ending any existing peace 
talks with the FARC.  Days later, former senator Ingrid Betancourt was kidnapped by a 
FARC column.  As of February 2003, the FARC had a total of six government officials in 
captivity.  By this point, the FARC and the ELN were almost completely discredited at 
home and abroad; assassinations, kidnappings, and attacks against civilian populations 
had done nothing but turn people against them (Marcella 2003:21-22).   
Alvaro Uribe 
Although Pastrana stayed committed to the peace process, his efforts failed, 
leaving the country in a state dominated by guerrillas.  In 2002, Alvaro Uribe replaced 
Pastrana as president and inherited the task of regaining control over Colombia.  He 
entered office determined to defeat guerrillas and paramilitaries, as well as to end 
narcotics trafficking.  However, immediately following his election, the FARC demanded 
the resignation of all departmental, municipal, and village officials—in the hope of 
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intimidating and embarrassing the Uribe administration during its early stages.  As a 
result, over 200 mayors resigned after receiving threats from the FARC.  In addition, 
many local governments became even more unstable than before his election.   
It seemed as if the stronger Uribe appeared, the harder the FARC attacked, 
attempting to divide the country with terrorist attacks.  For example, in April 2002, the 
FARC was responsible for kidnapping 12 parliamentarians in the center of Cali.  One 
month later, it slaughtered 119 men, women, and children seeking refuge in a church in 
Quibdó.  Within the first few months of Uribe’s presidency, more than 2 million 
Colombians were internally displaced.  However, this would not intimidate President 
Uribe (UNODC 2003:6).   
In May, after its attack on the church in Quibdó, the FARC stated that it would 
begin negotiations if it were to receive another “distension zone,” this one twice the size 
of the previous one.  Uribe responded, saying that negotiations would only proceed if 
there was an immediate cease fire and all acts of violence against the population were 
stopped.  Consequently, to this day, no negotiations have been successful with the FARC 
(Veilette 2005:7). 
Although the Uribe administration has not had success with the FARC or the 
ELN, as mentioned earlier, the AUC has begun a demobilization process.  President 
Uribe has been very persistent in carrying out his objectives, despite multiple obstacles.    
The FARC’s efforts to bully Uribe have been unsuccessful, as “he is determined to 
confront the political and psychological challenge to the Colombian State’s ability to 
govern and control territory” (Cooper 1993:2).  Uribe is committed to taking a proactive 
agenda to restore authority, and therefore, increase stability and security within the 
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country.  He has taken a hard line approach to negotiations.  He is only willing to 
negotiate with guerrilla groups who are willing to disarm and end terrorism.  This 
includes the paramilitary groups with which Pastrana had refused to negotiate.  He 
imposed a one-time 1.2% war tax on wealthy individuals and businesses to generate 
income for the military (Veilette 2005:6).   
Overall, Uribe has taken steps to improve Colombia’s armed forces, which have 
recently defeated guerrillas in a number of confrontations throughout the country, 
according to the UNODC.  By the end of 2003, armed forces were being deployed to 
areas that had previously been occupied by guerrillas.  Although Uribe does not have 
much to show for his efforts, many believe his hard line approach, in addition to his 
refusal to be intimidated by guerrilla action, has allowed him to take the necessary steps 
needed to eventually improve Colombia’s overall situation (Veilette 2005:6).  The 
Colombian people seem to agree; public support for Uribe continues to be high, largely 
because he has promised his own citizens, not to mention government officials in the 
United States that he will address his nation’s problems without giving into guerrilla 
organizations (Cooper 1993:1-5).  
U.S. Foreign Assistance to Colombia Continues?  
With Plan Colombia still in effect, U.S. aid continues to assist Colombia in its 
battle for victory in the ‘war on drugs.’  President George W. Bush has continued to 
support Colombia under the Andean Counter-drug Initiative (ACI), and through his 
endorsement of Plan Colombia (Veillette 2005:2).  Beyond that, in 2002, Congress 
approved the use of U.S. counter narcotic funds for a unified campaign to fight drug-
trafficking and organizations such as the FARC (Veillette 2005:2).  The primary 
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objectives of U.S. aid to Colombia include the following: stopping the flow of illegal 
drugs into the U.S., promotion of peace, and assistance in economic development—
perhaps for the underlying purpose of preserving democracy.  Colombian objectives are 
similar, but would emphasize increased security within its borders.  Both countries’ 
objectives have evolved over time, shifting from an emphasis on counter-narcotics to one 
of counter-terrorism.  However, this shift has not been very significant, as those involved 
in the drug trade and those who are listed as terrorists are largely one in the same.  As 
such, from FY 2000 to FY 2005, U.S. funding toward Plan Colombia has not wavered 
significantly, and has totaled approximately $4.5 billion.  This is noticeably more than in 
has been in previous years.  Furthermore, Colombia has also received military equipment, 
training, and support for alternative crop development. 
  The Bush administration, therefore, has continued Plan Colombia—and has even 
increased aid to Colombia under the Andean Counter-drug Initiative.  Given that such a 
large portion of aid has gone towards accomplishing goals in Colombia, it is important to 
analyze the overall effect it has had.  This may impact future decisions regarding aid to 
Colombia.  
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6. Why Study the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid and Why Colombia? 
Despite the research that indicates that foreign assistance is not effective, the 
United States continues to distribute a massive amount of foreign aid to the international 
community each year.  Foreign assistance is an essential part of U.S. foreign policy and 
continues to play a major role in U.S. foreign relations.  Therefore, it is essential that 
theories regarding the effectiveness of foreign aid continue to be debated and cases 
continue to be studied and analyzed.  Aid organizations need to have a clear 
understanding about how aid affects people, institutions, agriculture, and the poverty 
level of a recipient nation.  Agencies need to have a better idea of when aid is going to 
work and why.  This will help to eliminate future mistakes and to help increase the 
efficiency of aid programs—thus helping international communities and also improving 
U.S. foreign relations.   
With Colombia being one of the largest recipients of U.S. foreign aid, Colombia 
is an excellent country to study.  Analyzing the effect that foreign assistance has had in 
Colombia will help clarify the relationship aid has on growth, conflict, and drug-related 
objectives.  Studying the relationship between aid and growth will offer another analysis 
for comparison purposes.  This may clarify the importance of the geological location as 
well as sample size, as Colombia is the only country being analyzed. 
 In addition to aid’s relationship to growth, Colombia opens the door to further 
research on the relationship between aid and conflict.  Lessons learned from this will give 
policy makers more insight as to the most effective way to allocate aid in hostile 
situations.  This may be used to increase national security abroad in countries that are in 
constant conflict.  Studying the effect aid has had on Colombia during conflict, may also 
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give insight as to if it is even possible for aid to make a difference in such a difficult 
environment.  This may prevent large amounts of money being used in the future for 
purposes that would never yield desired results.   
 Studying the effectiveness of aid in Colombia will help aid agencies as well as 
policy makers know when to expect aid to be effective and when it is most likely to be 
ineffective.    
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7. Was Foreign Aid Effective?  
 
As mentioned above, there are many reasons why foreign aid fails when it is 
distributed to international communities.  In addition to the common pitfalls which 
include: trying to implement foreign aid programs in countries with poor policies and 
institutions, a lack of knowledge of the culture and the region, and a lack of 
communication between donor and recipient, past studies indicate other scenarios in 
which aid is not expected to be effective.  Although Colombia has avoided a few of these 
pitfalls, over the years, it has not been able to escape them all.  By understanding which 
pitfalls Colombia has avoided in addition to examining past studies conducted on aid and 
growth, one can better predict if aid has been effective in Colombia from 1980-2002.   
  One pitfall that Colombia may have avoided, has to do with its political policies.  
In this case, foreign aid may be effective in Colombia, because its policies are democratic 
in nature.  According to Burnside and Dollar, if a county has strong domestic policies, 
then aid is likely to be effective.  Since Colombia’s policies are democratic, this can have 
many positive effects.  For example, Colombia is one of Latin America’s oldest 
democracies; as such, there are obvious connections between it and its primary foreign 
aid donor––the United States.  This opens the door for both countries to agree upon 
similar objectives and a common philosophical language.  This has been the case with 
Plan Colombia.  Both countries want to preserve the Colombian democracy, and 
therefore have a common goal from which to start.   
Democratic policies may also give people an overall voice as to how they would 
like to address specific issues in Colombia.  This not only encourages Colombian citizens 
to find solutions to multiple problems from within, but it gives Colombians an overall 
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feeling of unity.  Optimism may increase due to the fact that Colombians have a say in 
what goes on within the nation.  Therefore, with an increase in foreign assistance, 
governmental officials will have more means necessary to carry out the demands of the 
citizens.   
Colombia’s democratic policies are expected to increase donor-recipient 
communication, which may increase the likelihood that foreign assistance is effective.  
However, Colombia is a weak state and therefore, the actual strength of those democratic 
policies may have been effected by its continual social problems.  Burnside and Dollar 
only observed a positive correlation between aid and developing countries that had strong 
policies.  Therefore, although Colombia’s polices are democratic, the strength of those 
policies is yet to be determined. 
Another pitfall that Colombia avoids is that its donor does not lack knowledge in 
terms of Colombia’s culture, region, or needs.  Over the years the United States has kept 
very close ties with Colombia.  During the 1980s, when a violent guerrilla movement 
emerged, the United States took an active role in attempting to negotiate peace treaties 
with the leaders of prominent guerrilla groups in Colombia (Sarmiento 1997:3).  This is a 
good indication that the United States understood the details of Colombia’s culture, 
region, and internal conflict, enough to intervene in cooperation with Colombian 
officials.     
We can see a more recent example of how the United States avoids this pitfall 
when examining Plan Colombia.  Colombian President Pastrana was the author of the 
original Plan Colombia proposal during the late 1990s, when he turned to the United 
States for help.  Although minor changes may have been made, Colombia benefits by 
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having its president as the author of the proposed document.  This definitely lends 
cultural awareness and sensitively to the final draft.  Since the United States has had an 
adequate knowledge of Colombia’s culture, region, and needs, this may increase the 
chance that foreign assistance impacted Colombia in a positive way. 
The last difficulty that sometimes leads to the failure of foreign aid is donor-
recipient communication. In the case of Colombia, it is difficult to predict how donor-
recipient communication will influence the effect of foreign assistance.  Overall, U.S.-
Colombian relations have been fair.  According to Cassen, good communication between 
the United States and Colombia was one of the major reasons Colombia was considered 
successful with foreign assistance in the 1970s.  However, beginning in the late 1980s, 
Colombia’s poor human rights record became an area of concern among the U.S. 
Congress (Aviles 2001:40).  Although this did not drastically hinder U.S.-Colombian 
communication, there are four years included in this analysis that U.S.-Colombian 
communication was devastating.   
According to Russell Crandall, Colombian President Samper (1994-1998), 
“deeply strained” the “bilateral relationship” (Crandall 2001:95).  Although President 
Pastrana was able to restore U.S.-Colombian relations during his presidency, the Samper 
administration hindered U.S.-Colombian communication.  In fact, Crandall claims that 
U.S.-Colombian relations during the Samper administration was one of the “most 
abrasive episodes in U.S.-Latin American relations since the end of the Cold War” 
(Crandall 2001:96).   
Since the Samper administration’s inability to communicate efficiently with the 
United States hindered donor-recipient communication for about four years, it is difficult 
 61
to predict how poor communication during this time influenced the effectiveness of 
foreign aid.  
Although Colombia avoids a few of these common pitfalls, there are reasons to 
believe that foreign assistance has had no impact in Colombia.  First, Colombia’s 
institutions are incredibly weak.  In the article, “Colombia: Failed, Failing, or Just 
Weak?,” Phillip McLean outlines how the emergence of the drug trade began the decline 
of Colombian institutions.  As the drug trade began to surface and gain popularity in the 
1980s, corruption began to weaken Colombian institutions.  Corruption has been seen in 
all aspects of Colombian society, from funding presidential elections to influencing local 
businessmen.  It has even been visible in Colombian sports organizations (McLean 
2002:127).  Since Colombia’s institutions are so fragile, and its bureaucracy is so weak, 
the country may not be able to distribute foreign aid in a productive manner.  In addition, 
if institutions have been corrupted, then money may be wasted on funding a corrupt 
organization.  In sum, foreign assistance to Colombia may be ineffective due to weak 
institutions that are unable to distribute additional funds effectively.  Similarly, foreign 
assistance may have no impact due to the corruption that existed in Colombian society.    
Upon analyzing the results from prior studies that test the relationship between aid 
and growth, literature suggests various scenarios where foreign assistance may be 
ineffective.  For example, Griffin and Enos found that an increase in aid led to a decrease 
in the country’s savings.  This hindered the growth of the recipient country.  Therefore, if 
assistance to Colombia has lowered savings in Colombia, then aid may not be effective.  
In addition, past studies indicate that aid is most likely to be ineffective if policies are not 
strong.  Although Colombia’s policies are democratic in nature, its history of violence 
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and corruption may have had an impact on how strong the policies are.  Colombia is a 
weak democracy.  This may override the fact that its policies are democratic.  Therefore, 
if Colombia’s policies, although democratic in nature, are not strong, then aid may have 
no impact in Colombia.       
Along the same lines, Peter Boon found that aid was not effective due to the fact 
that foreign aid actually increased inequality.  According to Boon, foreign aid does not 
reach the poor, nor does it change policies which tend to favor the elite.  Therefore, 
foreign assistance my have no impact on Colombia if the aid does not reach those that it 
is intended to help. 
Finally, Burnside and Dollar discuss a common reason that foreign assistance is 
not positively correlated with growth.  That is, often times, donors pursue their own 
interest rather than the interest of the recipient country.  If this is the case with foreign 
assistance to Colombia, aid is most likely to be ineffective. 
Due to the fact that existing literature is split on the effectiveness of foreign aid, 
and due to Colombia’s lack of bureaucracy and weak institutions, it is difficult to predict 
if foreign assistance has had an impact in Colombia.  In my analysis, I test this 
relationship.  Even though I do not test the direct relationship between aid and growth, I 
test the relationship between foreign assistance and variables representing three broad 
areas that are expected to be influenced by foreign aid to Colombia because they are 
explicit goals of U.S. foreign policy in the region.  Those broad areas include: 
Colombia’s law enforcement, guerrilla activity, and overall drug production.  Each broad 
area has been a primary focus of U.S. foreign assistance over the years.  Foreign aid 
programs have been designed in order to increase Colombia’s law enforcement, decrease 
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its guerrilla activity, and curb its overall drug production.  Although programs have been 
designed to address these three social issues, Colombia’s institutions are weak which has 
affected the strength of its policies.  Therefore, based on existing literature, I hypothesize 
that, due to the fact that Colombia is a weak state and its institutions are fragile, foreign 
assistance given to Colombia has had an insignificant effect on Colombia’s law 
enforcement, drug activity, and overall drug production.     
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8. Data and Methods 
Over the years, U.S. foreign aid has been given to Colombia in order to assist the 
Colombian government address its social, economic, and political problems.  
Specifically, foreign aid programs have been designed to increase Colombia’s military 
and law enforcement efforts in order to decrease its drug activity and provide more 
security for Colombian civilians.  In addition, U.S. foreign assistance has provided 
Colombia with the means necessary to fight guerrilla violence.  Therefore, in order to test 
the effectiveness of U.S. foreign assistance in Colombia, I chose three broad areas that 
reflect the overall goals of U.S. foreign assistance in Colombia.  These include drug-
related law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and overall drug production. 
Here I discuss the specific measures and data used to test the relationship between 
foreign aid and these three areas of policy outputs.2  As mentioned, this analysis explores 
the relationship of U.S. foreign aid on three broad areas of Colombia’s society.  These 
broad areas include law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and drug production.  Within 
each broad category there are key dependent variables that are analyzed in order to 
represent the broader category.  For example, in order to analyze the effect foreign aid 
has had on law enforcement, I look at how foreign assistance may influence the number 
of drug labs destroyed in Colombia, the amount of cocaine and base seized (kilos) in 
Colombia, and the amount of coca sprayed (ha) in Colombia from 1981-2001.     
In order to analyze the effect foreign aid has had on guerrilla violence; I evaluate 
the effect foreign assistance has had on the number of reported kidnappings (per thousand 
inhabitants) in Colombia from 1990-2002, in addition to, the number of homicides (per 
                                                 
2 Refer to Table 2 in Appendix A for a list of all concepts, variables, and sources included in the analysis. 
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thousand inhabitants) in Colombia from 1980-2002.  Finally, in order to assess the effect 
of foreign aid in the area of overall drug production, I test to see how foreign aid has 
affected the amount of estimated cultivation of coca (ha) in Colombia from 1983-2002.   
This section will discuss each variable used in detail in order to explain why each 
concept is significant and how each measure is an appropriate expression of a concept.  
Then, I begin my analysis by charting each key dependent variable and making 
comparisons between changes in these variables and the flow of U.S. foreign aid to 
Colombia from 1980-2002.  Finally, I conduct multivariate time-series analysis to 
explore the relationship that foreign assistance has had on each dependent variable.         
Dependent Variables 
As previously mentioned, there are three key dependent variables used in my 
analysis to test the effect that foreign assistance has had on Colombia’s law 
enforcement.3  All three variables were found via the Policía Nacional de Colombia 
website.  This is an informational website maintained by the Colombian government 
itself.  Also, data located here, was the one of the only sources available that provided the 
information needed—especially data measuring kidnappings and homicides.  The first 
key dependent variable used in my analysis to test the effect that foreign aid has had on 
law enforcement is the number of drug labs destroyed in Colombia from 1981-2001.  As 
mentioned earlier, Colombia has been involved in the drug trade since the 1970s.  In the 
1980s, Colombia’s role as the main drug processor set it apart from other countries in the 
Andean region (UNODC 2003:2).  Although Colombia cultivates and processes its own 
drugs, coca is often times imported to Colombia in order to be processed, and then 
                                                 
3 A list of all dependent variables is located in Table 2 of Appendix A. 
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exported to the United States and Europe (UNODC 2003:2).  By analyzing how many 
drug labs have been destroyed over time by Colombian police, one can better assess the 
effect that foreign assistance has had in assisting Colombian law enforcement in the 
detection and destruction of drug labs.  If there is a positive correlation between the 
amount of foreign aid given to Colombia and the number of drug labs destroyed in 
Colombia, then one can assume that foreign assistance to Colombia has helped law 
enforcement fight the war on drugs. 
 The second variable used to examine the impact that foreign assistance has had on 
law enforcement is the amount of cocaine and base seized (kilos) in Colombia from 1981-
2001.  Approximately 90 percent of the world’s cocaine industry originates in, or passes 
through, Colombia (Veilette 2005:3).  Although a few major drug cartels have been taken 
down over the years, Colombia still plays a major role in the exporting and trafficking of 
illegal drugs (UNODC 2003:15).  Therefore, testing the relationship between the amount 
of cocaine and base seized by the Colombian police and the amount of foreign assistance 
given to Colombia, will clarify the effect that foreign assistance has on the Colombian 
police’s ability to decrease Colombia’s drug flow.  If there is a positive correlation 
between the amount of cocaine and base seized and the amount of foreign assistance 
given to Colombia over time, then one can assume that foreign aid to Colombia has 
helped assist Colombian police improve interdiction efforts.   
 The third variable I use to determine the effect that foreign aid has had on 
Colombia’s law enforcement is the amount of coca sprayed (ha) in Colombia from 1981-
2001.  In the 1990s, Colombia became the world’s largest grower of the coca leaf (70 
percent of the world’s harvest).  Most of the coca growing in Colombia is located in areas 
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under the control of guerrilla groups and therefore, very difficult to address.  One way in 
which Colombian officials tried to curb the cultivation was through aerial fumigation.  
This allowed Colombian law enforcement to spray illegal coca crops from airplanes—
thus, discouraging the cultivation of illegal crops.  Although today aerial fumigation is 
highly debated and currently suspended in Colombia, for the past ten years it has been 
used by Colombian law enforcement as a primary way to deter coca cultivation.  In the 
past few years, the United States has increased support for aerial fumigation by providing 
aircrafts needed to spray the land (Veilette 2005:14).  By testing to see how aerial 
fumigation has changed over time with respect to the amount of foreign assistance 
Colombia has received, one can better understand the impact that foreign assistance has 
had in assisting Colombian law enforcement in meeting its objectives of reducing 
cultivation of coca.  If there is a positive relationship between the amount of coca sprayed 
and the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia, one can assume that foreign 
assistance helped Colombia’s law enforcement officials decrease cultivation by spraying 
more coca crops.   
 I use two key dependent variables to assess the impact foreign assistance has had 
on guerrilla violence.  The first is a change in the number of reported kidnappings (per 
thousand inhabitants) in Colombia from 1990-2002.  This data can be obtained from the 
Policía Nacional de Colombia website.4  Kidnappings are a common occurrence in 
Colombia.  In fact, Colombia has the highest number of kidnappings in the world 
(UNODC 2003:28).  Those who have a substantial amount of land, money, or power, 
                                                 
4 Data on reported kidnappings was obtained by the Policía Nacional, a government run program to 
enhance protection throughout Colombia. 
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along with their family members, are common targets for kidnappers.  The reason 
kidnappings are so prevalent in Colombia’s society is because of the large guerilla 
organizations (Rabasa 2001:45).  Ransom money collected from kidnappings is a primary 
source of income for guerrilla groups (UNODC 2003:28).  Therefore, in order to 
understand the impact that foreign assistance has had on guerrilla violence, I test the 
impact that foreign assistance has on the number of reported kidnappings in Colombia 
from 1990-2002.  If there is a statistically significant relationship between the amount of 
foreign assistance in Colombia, and the number of reported kidnappings, one can better 
understand the impact that foreign assistance has on Colombia’s ability to provide 
protection for the average civilian.  Specifically, if there is a relationship in the expected 
direction, then the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia should increase 
protection throughout Colombia—therefore, decreasing the number of reported 
kidnappings.  In sum, decreases in the number of kidnappings reported indicate a decline 
of overall guerrilla violence in Colombia, making kidnapping an appropriate mean of 
operationalizing the concept of guerrilla activity.  
 Although the number of kidnappings are a good indication of the level of guerilla 
violence in Colombia, one should keep in mind that, often times, kidnappings are not 
reported out of fear of what could happen if the incident is reported to Colombian police 
(UNODC 2003:28).  Such under-reporting may serve to weaken the accuracy of the data.  
Although it seems to be a reasonable assumption that under-reporting would represent a 
fairly consistent proportion of total kidnapping in the country.  Therefore, analyzing the 
level of kidnappings may not be appropriate, but since the emphasis here is on changes in 
kidnappings over time, under-reporting should not seriously undermine the validity of the 
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analysis.  A potentially more serious problem with the data is that the kidnapping 
statistics are only available for the twelve-year period of 1990-2002.  This small number 
of cases will make it difficult to find any significant effects of aid on this dependent 
variable. 
 In addition to kidnappings, another variable that is an appropriate indication of the 
amount of guerrilla violence in Colombia is a change in the number of homicides (per 
thousand inhabitants) from 1980-2002.  This data can also be obtained from the Policía 
Nacional de Colombia website.5  Over the years, guerillas have been responsible for the 
death of many innocent lives.  In the past, guerrillas and paramilitaries have even been 
responsible for wiping out entire villages in the rural areas of Colombia.  In addition to 
various massacres carried out by illegally armed groups, guerrillas have murdered many 
other Colombian civilians, especially those involved in the government (UNODC 
2003:25). 
 According to the UNODC, there is a direct relationship between drug-trafficking 
and homicides.  During the early 1990s, when drug-trafficking was at its peak, 
Colombia’s homicide rate also peaked, and when major drug cartels were dismantled, 
there was a drop in the homicide rate (UNODC 2003:26).  Therefore, I evaluate the 
change in Colombia’s homicide rate, and compare it to the amount of U.S. foreign 
assistance given to Colombia from 1980-2002.  If Colombia’s homicide rate increases or 
decreases due to the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia, one can assess the 
effect that foreign assistance has had on guerrilla violence.  If the number of homicides 
                                                 
5 The Policía Nacional is likely to have the most accurate data on the number of annual homicides in 
Colombia.  
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decreases with aid, then one can assume that foreign assistance had a direct effect on 
guerrilla violence in Colombia, as well as possibly has had an indirect influence on the 
drug trade. 
 Finally, in order to evaluate the effect that foreign assistance has had on the 
Colombian drug trade specifically, I choose a key dependent variable, the estimated 
cultivation of coca from 1983-2002, to reflect the change in overall drug production in 
Colombia.  This data can be obtained from the International Narcotics Strategy Report to 
Congress.6  When determining the effect that foreign assistance has had on Colombia’s 
overall drug trade, it is important to evaluate the estimated cultivation of illegal drugs in 
Colombia.  According to Phillip McLean, Colombia’s weak institutions are a direct result 
of corruption caused by illegal drug activity (McLean 2002:123).  Drug production has 
had severe consequences in all areas of Colombian society.  Despite many eradication 
efforts, there has been a steady increase in the amount of coca cultivation in Colombia.  
In order to monitor cultivation more closely; in 1999, the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime funded the “Illicit Crops Monitoring Project-SIMCI.”  This introduced 
technology, such as satellite imagery and aerial photographs, in order to locate and 
quantify the amount of coca cultivation in Colombia (UNODC 2003:4).   
 Since Colombia is the world’s number one coca leaf grower in the world, I chart 
the estimated cultivation of coca over time, compare it to the amount of foreign 
assistance given to Colombia, and then determine the relationship between coca 
cultivation and foreign aid through a multivariate regression analysis.  If there is a 
                                                 
6 In order to obtain the amount of estimated cultivation of coca in Colombia prior to 1997, it is necessary to 
review the reports to Congress under the “archives” section. 
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statistically significant negative relationship between the amount of estimated cultivation 
and foreign aid, then one can assume that foreign assistance has had an effect on the 
amount of coca cultivation in Colombia—thus curbing Colombia’s overall drug 
production.  
Independent Variables  
 Since the purpose of this study is to test for the effectiveness of U.S. foreign 
assistance, I divide U.S. foreign assistance into three key independent variables to better 
assess the impact of each type of aid; these include economic loans and grants, military 
loans and grants, and total loans and grants, which is the sum of the economic and 
military loans and grants.7  Each of the three key independent variables are used to 
measure the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia from 1980-2002, and can be 
obtained from the U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, also known as the USAID 
Greenbook.  In each Greenbook, foreign assistance is reported by the recipient country 
annually, and then organized by the United State Agency for International Development 
(USAID).  Unfortunately, data regarding the amount of U.S. foreign assistance 
distributed throughout the world is very complicated and poorly organized.  There are 
multiple aid organizations that distribute assistance, and often times, organizations 
exclude some aid sources from their data compilations.  Although the USAID 
Greenbooks do not include every aid organization or every program funded by U.S. 
foreign aid, the Greenbook is, overall, an adequate measure of how much foreign 
assistance was distributed to a specific country over time.  Additionally, comparing 
Greenbook data to other data sources suggests that these data track consistently over time 
                                                 
7 A list of all independent variables is located in Table 2 of Appendix A. 
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with those figures provided by other sources.  Therefore, for the purpose of this study, I 
use data collected from the USAID Greenbook to reflect the general trend in foreign 
assistance given to Colombia from 1980-2002. 
According to the USAID Greenbook, a loan is any transfer of funds in which the 
recipient acquires a legal debt, and repayment is required over time.  A grant is any cash 
transfer for which the recipient incurs no legal debt.  In this study, I include both loans 
and grants to evaluate the overall assistance (total, economic, and military assistance) 
given to Colombia.   
Total economic assistance is broken down into four funding categories.  These 
categories include aid distributed by USAID and its Predecessor, by the Department of 
Agriculture, by the Department of State, and by other economic assistance programs.  
The first category of USAID funds includes all assistance that accounts for funding under 
USAID programs.  Assistance distributed under the Department of Agriculture typically 
consists of food aid programs funded by the Department of Agriculture.  Aid programs 
listed under the Department of State include those programs specifically designed for 
narcotics control and current Andean counter drug initiatives, along with other programs 
that support increasing democracy abroad.  Finally, the category titled, Other Economic 
Assistance, includes any other active economic loan or grant reported annually.  This 
includes programs such as the Peace Corps, along with contributions from multilateral 
organizations that are targeted at economic development (USAID). 
 In the USAID Greenbook, total military assistance includes loans or grants with a 
non-economic-development purpose.  Military assistance includes programs such as 
International Military Education & Training (IMET), Peace Keeping Operations (PKO), 
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and Foreign Military Funds (FMF).  Finally, total loans and grants include the total 
amount of economic loans and grants and military loans and grants combined.  In 
addition, total loans and grants also include non-concessional support that consists of 
export-import bank loans and other non-concessional U.S. Loans including those 
distributed by the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC).  Generally speaking, 
this data includes any direct loan or loan guarantee reported by Colombia for any specific 
year.8  
When analyzing data results regarding economic and military data, one should 
approach results with caution.  A significant amount of foreign aid was given to 
Colombia in the form of “narcotics aid,” specifically designed to reduce narco-trafficking 
and other drug activity.  In reality, this money was split between economic assistance 
programs and military assistance programs, with the majority of the money going toward 
military programs.  USAID, however, groups the entire narcotics fund into the category 
of economic assistance.  Therefore, the amount of total military assistance to Colombia is 
actually higher than what is presented in this data analysis, and the economic aid is 
accordingly reduced.9,10  Of course, this discrepancy is consistent throughout all data 
years, and the total loans and grants figure does not suffer from this shortcoming.   
                                                 
8 USAID also indicates Loan Programs that have become inactive.  However, this data is not available prior 
to FY 2003. 
9 Clarification regarding what programs the USAID Greenbooks include and exclude was obtained via 
personal communication with Adam Isacson, an employee for The Center for International Policy’s. 
10 Prior to FY 2003, data in the USAID Greenbooks do not include assistance to some economic or military 
programs.  The Greenbook does not include economic and social assistance programs such as the Counter 
Terror Fellowship Program (2000-2003), Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies which began in 1997, 
Section 1004, Section 1033 (data not available prior to 1997), Discretionary Funds (popular in the late 
1990s), Small Arms and Light Weapons Program, Excess Defense Articles, and Emergency Drawdowns.  
The majority of the data lacking in the Greenbook is related to military assistance.  Therefore, when 
interpreting data it is important to keep in mind that total economic assistance includes the entire narcotics 
fund.  Also, many military assistance programs (most from the Department of Defense), are not included in 
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Other Independent Variables 
In addition to the key independent variables discussed above, throughout my analysis I 
account for several other factors that might influence the policy objectives being 
examined here as dependent variables.  When testing the effect that foreign assistance has 
in the broad area of drug-related law enforcement activity, I first control for the 
Colombia’s level of democracy by using data from 1980-2002, obtained from the Polity 
IV.   Colombia’s polity score measures its level of institutionalized democracy.  This data 
was taken from Polity IV which subtracts the state’s autocracy score from its democracy 
score to produce an eleven-point indicator of structural democracy—a score of 10 being 
the most democratic.  Here, democracy is partially determined by the ability of citizens to 
express effective views about existing policies and leaders.  Additionally, the level of 
constraints placed on the executive in power is taken into consideration, with a greater 
level indicative of higher levels of democracy.  Autocracy represents a lack of political 
freedoms that may restrict or suppress competitive political participation.  An eleven 
point autocracy scale is constructed additively according to five areas: Competitiveness 
of Executive Recruitment, Openness of Executive Recruitment, Constraints on Chief 
Executive, Regulation of Participation, and Competitiveness of Participation.  The total 
autocracy number is then subtracted by the number reflecting institutionalized democracy 
(Polity IV).    
Second, I control for the economic state of Colombia by including its GDP per 
capita.  This data came from the World Development Indicators 2004.  Colombia’s GDP 
                                                                                                                                                 
the data.  Although I include the analysis of each type of data, one could probably draw more accurate 
results by assessing how total loans and grants affected the dependent variable. 
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per capita is an acceptable way to measure the size and condition of its economy.  This is 
important because as Colombia’s economy is stimulated, more money can be spent on 
law enforcement objectives.  Furthermore, a poor economy reduces the amount of 
available money, therefore decreasing the average income.  Therefore, Colombia’s 
economic environment may directly increase or decrease the available funds needed to 
carry out law enforcement objectives.  As suggested by existing literature, controlling for 
a country’s economic environment is essential to gaining an accurate measure of the 
impact of aid (Durbarry 2000:4).  If Colombia’s economy is stimulated, then the 
government may have the means necessary to increase law enforcement across the 
country.   
Finally, I control for Colombia’s presidential party affiliation by using a dummy 
variable to control for Colombia’s conservative Presidents.  In this study, President 
Uribe, an independent, is coded the same as a president affiliated with the Liberal party, 
due to the fact that his origins were in the Liberal party.  Also, my objective is to test 
conservative versus non-conservative presidents.11  When controlling for Colombia’s 
presidential party, one could expect, that if Colombia’s president belongs to the 
Conservative party, then drug-related law enforcement activity may increase due to 
general accepted policies of the Conservative party.  In addition, I also use a trend 
variable to address the natural trending in the dependent variables and address the issue 
of autocorrelation.   
Those variables that affect law enforcement similarly affect the dependent 
variables that measure guerrilla violence, with an additional variable that measures 
                                                 
11 Treating President Uribe uniquely does not change the findings. 
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Colombia’s unemployment rate from the International Labor Office (ILO).  In this case, 
the level of democracy, measured using the Polity score, is important because if 
Colombia becomes more democratic, guerrilla groups may be more likely to have a say 
in overall policies, and therefore, are less likely to engage in violence.  For example, in 
the past, guerrilla leaders have created their own parties and won local elections; this may 
decrease the overall level of violence carried out by guerrillas for political purposes (Von 
der Walde 2001:2).  Therefore, as Colombia’s level of democracy increases, guerrilla 
violence that is motivated by political reasons is expected to decrease—as the guerillas 
participate in democratic elections.   
 Colombia’s GDP per capita may also influence guerrilla violence.  If Colombia’s 
economy is improving, guerrillas may find it more difficult to recruit soldiers.  On the 
contrary, if Colombia’s GDP per capita is low, than the average citizen may do whatever 
is necessary to provide for himself and his family, even if it means joining illegally armed 
groups.  Also, if Colombia’s economy is not stable, then the average citizen may be 
driven to violence, even apart from guerrilla violence.  Finally, a poor economy may 
increase guerrilla violence by creating more of a need to obtain money from kidnapping.  
In sum, if Colombia’s GDP per capita is low, then there are reasons to believe that 
guerilla violence will increase out of the necessity to provide and survive (suggested in 
Durbarry 1998).  
 Along the same lines, when measuring Colombia’s GDP per capita, I control for 
Colombia’s unemployment rate from 1980-2002.  A change in Colombia’s 
unemployment rate may increase guerrilla violence, in the sense that those who are 
unemployed may go to extreme measures to do what is necessary to survive.  An increase 
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in unemployment may drive the average citizen to begin working with drug traffickers 
and guerrilla groups.  This may increase the number of people working in the drug trade, 
which previously mentioned, has a direct relationship with violence (UNODC 2003:25).  
Similar to that of law enforcement, controlling for Colombia’s conservative 
presidential affiliation may indicate a decrease in the amount of guerrilla violence.  As 
previously mentioned, conservatives are more likely to increase law enforcement and 
military activity, thus affecting overall violence in Colombia (suggested in Crandall 
2001).  
 Finally, when assessing Colombia’s overall drug production, I test to see a change 
in the estimated cultivation of coca in Colombia.  When analyzing a change in the 
estimated cultivation of coca, I include these control variables: Colombia’s polity score, 
GDP per capita, unemployment rate, Conservative presidential party affiliation, and 
Colombia’s rural population density obtained from the World Bank.  
In this case, Colombia’s level of democracy may have influenced the amount of 
estimated cultivation by creating new and innovative ways to address the issue.  For 
example, if Colombia became more democratic, and the average farmer was able to 
affectively communicate his needs to the Colombian government, then it is possible that 
farmers would have been more likely to work with the government in addressing the 
issue of illegal cultivation.  The Colombian government has continually developed 
alternative agricultural programs for farmers, in order to give farmers the resources 
necessary to avoid illicit cultivation.  Therefore, one can assume that the more democratic 
the country became the less estimated cultivation of coca occurred.   
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Colombia’s GDP per capita is also an important control variable because a change 
in the country’s GDP per capita may reflect the available resources needed to spend on 
alternative development programs for farmers.  Therefore, one can assume that, if 
Colombia’s economy was stimulated, then the government would have had more 
resources available to farmers.  If farmers received what they needed from the 
government, instead of drug traffickers, then they may have been more likely to grow 
legitimate crops.  Therefore, if there was an overall increase in Colombia’s GDP per 
capita, then it is possible that the estimated cultivation may have decreased (Burnside 
2000:32).   
An increase in Colombia’s unemployment rate may have also impacted the 
country’s estimated cultivation of coca.  As previously mentioned, an increase in 
unemployment may turn people to violence and crime.  Similarly, an increase in 
unemployment may have reduced confidence in Colombia’s government to provide for 
the people.  Therefore, farmers and civilians that were dependent on legitimate crops may 
have turned to where the money is in order to survive and provide for themselves and 
their families.  With an increase in unemployment, one could expect that the amount of 
estimated cultivation of coca would have increased in Colombia (suggested in Durbarry 
1998:1).  
 In addition to Colombia’s polity score, GDP per capita, and its unemployment 
rate, Colombia’s presidential party affiliation, may have had an impact on the amount of 
estimated cultivation in Colombia.  One again, if Colombia’s president is conservative, 
one could expect tighter military and police activity.  Therefore, if Colombia’s president 
belonged to the conservative party, the amount of estimated cultivation in Colombia may 
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have decreased as the conservative policies may have increased law enforcement activity 
(suggested in Hartlyn 1998).. 
Finally, Colombia’s rural population density provides a reflection on the amount 
of land that may be available for the cultivation of any plant, including the coca plant.  
Therefore, a change in Colombia’s rural population density may result in a change of 
overall coca cultivation.  If Colombia’s rural population density increase, then it is likely 
that available land for growing coca would have decreased, resulting in an overall 
decrease of estimated cultivation of coca.  Collectively, then, these reasons indicate why I 
have chosen to focus on analyzing the data outlined herein (Arce forthcoming:18). 
 To analyze these data, two approaches will be used.  First, a visual examination of 
the charts that plot the dependent variables over time will be conducted, comparing the 
observed trends to those that exist in the charts of aid over time.  If trends in the 
dependent variables are similar to those for aid, it suggests that aid and the dependent 
variables are correlated.   
 Second, a more sophisticated examination of these data will involve the use of 
multiple time-series analysis using ordinary least squares regression.  This statistical 
technique makes it possible to estimate the size and nature of the statistical relationship 
between a dependent and independent variable.  Additionally, this technique makes it 
possible to control for other variables that may influence changes in the dependent 
variables. 
 One difficulty in performing time-series analysis with ordinary least squares 
regression is the presence of autocorrelation.  This is defined as, “correlation between 
members of observations ordered in time [as in time-series data]” (Gujarati 1999:378).  
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The problem that autocorrelation poses for estimating a model using ordinary least 
squares regression is that it results in tests of statistical significance for the regression 
coefficients that are biased.  Without taking this problem into consideration I could make 
decisions about the statistical significance of the regression coefficients that are not 
correct.  The Durbin-Watson statistic is used to determine if autocorrelation is a problem 
for each model.  In most cases, the Durbin-Watson statistic indicated that autocorrelation 
was present in the models.  When this is the case, a trend variable is included that begins 
at 0 for the first year and increases by 1 for each following year.  The coefficients for the 
other variables are then interpreted as the influence of the independent variable on the 
dependent variable, holding year constant.  
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9. Bivariate Analysis 
In order to better understand how each key dependent variable has changed over 
time, I have graphed the available data for each dependent variable.  Also, I have graphed 
the total amount of loans and grants distributed to Colombia from 1980-2002.  After 
graphing each key dependent variable, I discuss how the dependent variable has changed 
over time and compare it to the change in total loans and grants distributed to Colombia.  
This will help illustrate the direction of the dependent variable over time, compared to the 
total foreign assistance given to Colombia.12  By evaluating data represented in each 
graph, one may be able to identify a relationship between a key dependent variable and 
the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia.   
Figure 1 presents the total amount of U.S. loans and grants given to Colombia 
from 1980-2002 in Constant $U.S.  In 1980, Colombia received $46.8 million.  U.S. 
foreign aid to Colombia remained relatively constant for approximately ten years.  
However, in 1990, total loans and grants to Colombia increased in order to assist the 
nation in fighting the war on drugs.  In 1990, Colombia received $123.3 million in U.S. 
foreign assistance, a slight increase compared to prior years.  This is most likely due to 
President H.W. Bush’s $2.2 billion increase in aid to the Andean region.  However, over 
the next five years, foreign assistance began to decrease.  This is most likely due to the 
election of President Clinton and his decision to decrease anti-narcotics funding.  In 
1995, foreign assistance began to gradually increase as the Republican party took over 
the U.S. Congress and allotted funds once again in support of fighting the drug war.  
Finally, in 2000, U.S. foreign assistance reached its peak at $1,231.1 million.  This 
                                                 
12 Refer to Appendix B for each figure discussed in this section. 
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reflects the implementation of Plan Colombia.  Although aid to Colombia spiked in 2000, 
assistance was not sustained at this level.  Even so, for the next two years total foreign 
assistance would remain higher than any other year prior to 2000.  In 2002, Colombia’s 
assistance fell to $550.7 million, which was approximately half of what it was in 2000.  
In sum, total foreign assistance to Colombia remained relatively constant until the 1990s 
when aid slightly increased.  Following a minimal decrease, aid began to increase again, 
after 1995.  Aid drastically increased in 2000, and then dropped in 2001.  Although aid 
was not sustained after 2000, foreign assistance was relatively higher compared to its 
previous years. 
Figures 2 and 3 present the trends in the variables used to represent law enforcement 
activity in Colombia.   Specifically, Figure 2 plots the total number of drug labs destroyed 
from 1981-2001, in addition to, the cumulative amount of loans and grants given to 
Colombia from 1980-2002.  In 1981, 31 drug labs were destroyed by the Colombian 
armed forces.  For subsequent years, the number of labs destroyed gradually increased 
until 1987, when it reached its peak at 1,359 labs destroyed.  This is consistent with fact 
that during the 1980s, drug activity was beginning to surface in Colombia.  One would 
expect that if overall drug activity increased during the 1980s, then so would the number 
of drug lab used in order to process illegal drugs.  Therefore, if more drugs labs were 
being established in order to process more drugs, then it is likely that law enforcement 
detected and destroyed more labs, as the overall number of labs increased. 
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, the number of labs consistently decreased 
until 1996 when the number of labs destroyed reached 885.  For the next three years, 
there was a gradual decrease in labs destroyed.  However, in 1999 and 2000, the number 
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of labs destroyed began to increase again.  Since the number of labs destroyed reached its 
peak in 1987, when foreign assistance to Colombia was relatively low, and then peaked 
again in 1996, this graph does not seem to indicate that past foreign assistance has helped 
to improve law enforcement with regard to the number of drug labs destroyed.  Also, 
since there is no gradual trend in the number of labs destroyed, it is difficult to know if 
the increase after year 2000 is due to the increase of aid in Colombia or not.  Although 
there seems to be no relationship between the number of drug labs destroyed, and the 
amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia, we will be able to assess the relationship 
in more detail, after analyzing the multivariate analysis.     
Figure 3 plots two key dependent variables that represent law enforcement 
activity in Colombia.  First, Figure 3 shows the amount of cocaine and base seized (kilos) 
from Colombian law enforcement from 1981-2001.  In 1981, the amount of cocaine and 
base seized amounted to about 359 kilos.  For the next four years, there was an increase 
in the amount of cocaine and base seized until 1985, when it began to decrease.  The 
amount of cocaine and base seized, spiked in 1991 when Colombian officers seized 
approximately 81,000 kilos of cocaine and base.  Although the amount of cocaine and 
base seized spiked again in 1994, an overall decrease in cocaine and base seized occurred 
for the next eight years.   
After graphing the available data for the amount of cocaine and base seized 
(kilos), and then comparing it with the total amount of foreign assistance given to 
Colombia, one may observe a slight relationship between the amount of cocaine and base 
seized, and the total amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia.  For example, the 
total amount of cocaine and base seized in Colombia, spiked in 1991, approximately one 
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year after President H.W. Bush initiated his $2.2 billion Andean Initiative (Crandall 
2001:101).   
Although the amount of cocaine and base seized reached its peak in 1991, from 
that point forward the overall amount of cocaine and base seized began to decrease, even 
as the total amount of foreign assistance increased.  Therefore, after comparing the 
amount of cocaine and base seized to the total amount of foreign assistance to Colombia 
over time, one may predict that the two variables might have a very slight relationship; 
however, it is not likely that the relationship is significant. Again, more specific 
conclusions can be determined after examining the results of the multivariate analysis.     
  The second line plotted in Figure 3 is the amount of coca sprayed (ha) in 
Colombia by aerial fumigation from 1981-2001.  Aerial fumigation is a relatively new 
way to deter farmers from growing illegal crops.  Therefore, there was no coca sprayed 
from 1981-1984.  However, in 1985, 1,334 ha of coca were sprayed by the Colombian 
military.  The amount of coca sprayed remained low until the mid-1990s when aerial 
fumigation began to rapidly increase.  In 1995, about 25,000 ha of coca were sprayed.  
Two years later, approximately 41,000 ha of coca were sprayed.  One year later, in 1998, 
aerial fumigation increased to about 66,083 ha of coca sprayed.  Finally, in 2001, the 
amount of coca sprayed reached its peak at 94,153 ha of coca sprayed.  In sum, beginning 
in the mid-1990s, the amount of coca sprayed by Colombian law enforcement increased 
over time, and reached it peak in 2001. 
After graphing the amount of coca sprayed (ha), and comparing it with the total 
amount of foreign assistance to Colombia, one can see an obvious parallel relationship 
between the two variables.   For example, the amount of coca sprayed began to steadily 
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increase beginning in 1994.  One year later, the amount of foreign assistance to Colombia 
began to incline.  Similarly, the amount of coca sprayed reached its peak in 2001—one 
year after Plan Colombia was initiated.  Therefore, both variables that measure the 
amount of coca sprayed and total loans and grants show an overall steady increase that 
began in the mid-1990s and peaked in 2001.  In sum, both data indicate similar trends and 
therefore may possibly be correlated.  However, one will be able to clarify the exact 
relationship after regressing the amount of coca sprayed on the total loans and grants to 
Colombia. 
Figures 4 and 5 present the variables used to represent guerrilla violence in 
Colombia.  Specifically, Figure 4 plots the total number of kidnappings (per thousand 
inhabitants) reported in Colombia from 1990-2002.  In 1990, about 1,000 kidnappings 
were reported in Colombia.  The following year, reported kidnappings increased by about 
a thousand.  For the next four years, kidnappings remained relatively lower, but after 
1995, kidnappings began to gradually increase—most likely due to the increase in 
guerrilla violence and drug activity.  Reported kidnappings peaked in 1999 with 3,706.  
The following years show a constant decrease in reported kidnappings.  However, 
although the number of kidnappings (per thousand in inhabitants) gradually decreases, 
kidnappings remained relatively high until 2002.  It appears that the total amount of 
reported kidnappings (per thousand inhabitants) gradually increases over time. 
After graphing the number of reported kidnappings and comparing the available 
data to the total loans and grants given to Colombia from 1980-2002, one can see that 
both kidnappings (per thousand in habitants) and total loans and grants gradually 
increased during the late 1990s and peaked around year 2000.  Also, both decreased after 
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2001, but remained higher, compared to earlier years.  This data indicates that a 
relationship between the amount of kidnappings and the amount of foreign assistance 
may have a slight relationship in the opposite, expected, direction.  If this is the case, then 
other variables such as Colombia’s GDP per capita or its unemployment rate may be 
other potential factors that influence the number of reported kidnappings. 
Figure 5 plots the number of homicides (per thousand inhabitants) that occurred in 
Colombia from 1981-2002.  In 1981, about 10,000 people were murdered.  Over the next 
ten years, Colombia’s homicide rate gradually increased and peaked in 1991 with 
approximately 28,000 homicides.  This is most likely due to the violent guerrilla 
movement that occurred during the 1980s and 1990s.  After Colombia’s homicide rate 
peaked in 1991, there was a constant decrease until 2002—however even then, the 
homicide rate was relatively higher than previous years.   
Although the data does not illustrate a direct relationship between the number of 
homicides in Colombia from 1981-2002 and the total loans and grants given to Colombia 
from 1980-2002, it is difficult to assess any relationship between the two variables.  
Colombia’s homicide rate reached its peak in 1991, approximately the same time that aid 
slightly increased to Colombia.  However, as foreign assistance remained relatively 
consistent from 1990 to 1997, the homicide rate began to decrease following 1991.  
When aid began to increase again after 1997, the country’s homicide rate began to 
steadily increase as well.  Therefore, based on both graphs, it is difficult to determine if 
there is any relationship between Colombia’s homicide rate and the amount of foreign 
assistance given to Colombia. 
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Figure 6 presents the trend in the variable used to represent the overall drug 
production in Colombia.  Specifically, Figure 6 plots the amount of estimated cultivation 
of coca (ha) in Colombia from 1983-2002.  In 1983, about 11,000 ha of coca were 
cultivated in Colombia.  From that point forward, the amount of coca cultivated gradually 
increased over time.  In the 1980s, coca cultivation reached a high of about 43,000 ha of 
coca.  This would seem like a small number by 2002, when estimated cultivation reached 
its peak at 267,145 ha.   
Overall, beginning in 1983, the amount of estimated cultivation of coca in 
Colombia steadily increased over time until it reaches its peak in 2002.  This is similar to 
the trend illustrated in the total amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia from 
1980-2002.  Based on the comparison between the estimated cultivation of coca over 
time, and the total amount of loans and grants given to Colombia over time, a parallel 
trend can be observed.  Both data represent a small quantity in the early 1980s, and then 
gradually increase over time until the late 1990s.  Therefore, based on the comparison of 
raw data, there appears to be a relationship between the amount of estimated cultivation 
of coca and the amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia.  However, this 
relationship negative, opposite the expected direction.   
In sum, a visual comparison that presents the trends in the variables used to 
represent law enforcement activity in Colombia, indicate only a partial support for the 
hypothesis that the amount of foreign assistance is related to law enforcement activity in 
Colombia.  It appears that the amount of coca sprayed increased over time with aid, 
exhibiting a very similar trend.  Therefore, foreign assistance may have influenced the 
amount of law enforcement activity, but only with respect to aerial fumigation.  There is 
 88
no evidence of a bivariate correlation with the other dependent variables measuring law 
enforcement. 
Similarly, a visual comparison that presents the trends in the variables used to 
represent guerrilla violence in Colombia, indicate that foreign assistance has no 
significant relationship to the amount of guerrilla violence in Colombia.  Although the 
number of reported kidnappings increased over time, as did aid, this data is inconsistent 
with the expected direction.  Therefore, one can assume that other factors may influence 
the increase of reported kidnappings, apart from foreign assistance.  Based on the visual 
comparison of Colombia’s homicide rate and the amount of foreign assistance, data was 
inconclusive.  There was no indication that foreign assistance influenced Colombia’s 
homicide rate. 
Finally, the figures indicate that overall drug production in Colombia manifests a 
similar trend to that of foreign assistance.  Both variables, estimated cultivation in 
Colombia and total loans and grants given to Colombia indicate an overall increase over 
time.  Both data began with a small amount and increase annually until the total amount 
of foreign aid peaked in 2000.  Therefore, similar trends in the data suggest that there 
may be a relationship between the amount of estimated cultivation in Colombia and the 
amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia.  Although the plotted data shows similar 
trends, the data suggest a relationship that is opposite of the expected direction.  
Therefore, on could assume that other factors may be directly related to the overall 
estimated cultivation of coca. 
Although plotting the key dependent variables and comparing them with the total 
loans and grants given to Colombia may suggest some relationships between key 
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variables, there are limitations for testing the hypothesis in this manner.  It is a suggestive 
interpretation of the overall trends in the dependent variable compared to the independent 
variable.  However, no statistical estimate of the relationship of foreign aid and the 
dependent variable can be made.  Other factors that may influence the relationship 
between foreign aid and the dependent variable were not taken into consideration when 
interpreting the comparison of data.  A better approach to test the hypothesis that 
overcomes these limitations is the use of a multivariate time-series analysis using 
ordinary least squares regression.   
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10. Multivariate Analysis 
Analysis of Law Enforcement 
A more sophisticated way to test the relationship between foreign assistance and 
the variables that represent law enforcement, guerrilla violence, and drug production, is 
to conduct a multivariate time-series analysis using ordinary least squares.  In this 
section, I regress each type of foreign assistance (total, economic, and military) on each 
key dependent variable.13  To test the relationship between aid and law enforcement, I 
regress all types of aid on the number of drug labs destroyed, the amount of cocaine and 
base seized (kilos), and the amount of coca sprayed (ha) from 1981-2001.   
The multivariate regression analysis that examines the relationship between the 
number of drug labs destroyed and foreign assistance is presented in Table 3.14  One 
would expect that if foreign assistance programs are accomplishing its goals, then the 
number of drug labs destroyed in Colombia would increase with aid.  However, Models 
1, 2, and 3 do not indicate a causal relationship between the number of drug labs 
destroyed and the amount of foreign assistance (total, economic, or military) distributed 
to Colombia.   
One objective of aid programs has been to increase law enforcement in order to 
decrease drug activity.  Therefore, foreign assistance programs are specifically designed 
to increase law enforcement personnel, which would allow police to check areas 
previously unmonitored.  This is important in the actual detection of drug labs.  In 
addition to an increase in law enforcement personnel, foreign assistance programs have 
                                                 
13 Refer to Table 2 in Appendix A for a description of each variable. 
14 Table 3 is located in Appendix A. 
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aimed to increase training in the area of military intelligence—specifically as it relates to 
combating drug activity.  This may also be useful when attempting to detect newly-
established drug laboratories.  Therefore, since the data show no correlation between the 
amount of foreign assistance given to Colombia and the number of drug labs destroyed, 
foreign aid does not seem to have an effect on law enforcement in this area.   
One possible reason that aid shows no correlation may be explained by the 
corruption of law enforcement officials.  According to the UNODC, in 2002, a corruption 
scandal surfaced that reflected irregularities in how anti-narcotic aid was being used.  
This specific scandal involved Anti-Narcotics police using foreign assistance in order to 
cover the cost of unauthorized trips.  In spite of anti-corruption policies, corruption still 
seems to be weakening havoc on Colombia’s institutions.  If corruption has influenced 
law enforcement in this way, additional aid would not effectively assist the overall goals 
of increasing law enforcement activity.  Therefore, it is not surprising that aid shows no 
relationship with the number of drug labs destroyed (UNODC 2003:27).   
 One variable that is statistically significant across all three models is the dummy 
variable measuring Colombia’s conservative presidents.  The data indicates that if 
Colombia’s president belongs to the Conservative party, then the number of drug labs 
destroyed is expected to decrease by approximately 400 labs.  Across all three models, 
the data are statistically significant at the 90% confidence level (or alpha of .10).  These 
findings are consistent with what is generally expected from the Conservative party.  
Conservative policies are usually more likely to increase military and law enforcement 
efforts.  Therefore, it is not surprising to find a relationship between a president’s party 
affiliation and the number of drug labs destroyed.  In this table there are no other 
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variables that are statistically significant with the number of drug labs destroyed in 
Colombia. 
 Across all three models in Table 3, the R-Squared values are very low and none of 
the F values are statistically significant.  This indicates that the models neither fit the data 
well, nor are they statistically strong.  However, in each model, the Durbin-Watson 
statistic is close to 2, indicating no appreciable autocorrelation. 15  In sum, Table 3 
indicates that foreign assistance is not correlated with the number of drug labs destroyed.  
However, the president’s party affiliation does seem to impact law enforcement in this 
area.  Overall, these findings are consistent with the hypothesis, that U.S. foreign 
assistance to Colombia will not improve the effectiveness of law enforcement activity.  
The multivariate regression analysis that examines the relationship between the 
amount of cocaine and base seized and U.S. foreign assistance is presented in Table 4.16  
Assuming that foreign assistance programs are increasing interdiction efforts, one would 
expect to see an increase in the amount of drugs seized by police as aid increases.  
Specific programs have been designed in order to increase law enforcement and target 
narco-trafficking.  The United States has funded programs such as the Air Bridge Denial 
program and the Special Reconnaissance and Assault Unit of the Colombian Navy, in 
order to increase both aerial and maritime interdiction.   
However, after running the regression analysis, the data indicate that there is no 
significant relationship between the amount of foreign assistance (of any type) given to 
                                                 
15 The Durbin-Watson statistic indicated that autocorrelation was present in some models.  When this is the 
case, a trend variable is included that begins at 0 for the first year and increases by 1 for each following 
year.  The coefficients for the other variables are then interpreted as the influence of the independent 
variable on the dependent variable, holding year constant. 
16 Table 4 is located in Appendix A. 
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Colombia and the amount of cocaine and base seized.  Again, one reason for this may be 
corruption within Colombia’s law enforcement institutions.  One of the most important 
institutions that are responsible for drug control in Colombia is the Anti-Narcotics Police.  
As previously determined, corruption has been a concern for officials within this specific 
institution.  In addition, corruption within Colombia’s law enforcement has been 
addressed by the U.S. Congress almost annually, prior to 1998.  Over the years, some 
Colombian law enforcement officials have seemingly worked with those involved in the 
drug trade.  In fact, in 1998, Colombian security forces fired about 90 officers that were 
believed to be corrupt (Crandall 2001:105).  Assuming that corruption has weakened law 
enforcement efforts, one would not expect additional assistance to improve overall law 
enforcement interdiction efforts. 
This is consistent with what was hypothesized.  If Colombia’s institutions are 
weak and lack the capacity to use funds appropriately, this would undermine the 
effectiveness of law enforcement efforts such as cocaine seized, even with an increase in 
aid.  Therefore, foreign assistance would show no correlation with the amount of cocaine 
and base seized by Colombian police.  
 In all three models, GDP per capita, which is used to control for the overall state 
of the Colombian economy, is statistically significant.  This indicates that as Colombia’s 
economy was stimulated, the amount of cocaine and base seized also increased.  In fact, 
for every one dollar increase in GDP per capita, we can expect the amount of cocaine and 
base seized to increase by about 55 kilos.  To use more realistic numbers, with every 
$1,000 increase in GDP per capita, one would expect the amount of cocaine and base 
seized to increase by 55,000 kilos. This is statistically significant at the 95% confidence 
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level (or alpha .05).  These findings are not surprising.  In fact, if the economy is 
stimulated, then more overall resources may be available for interdiction operations.  
Also, if the economy is doing well, people may be less likely to work with drug 
traffickers.  An overall stimulation of the economy will help Colombians feel optimistic 
about the government’s role in fighting the drug war.  Aside from the GDP per capita, no 
other independent variable was statistically significant.  
 Across all three models, the R-squared value is around .7 which indicates that the 
model describes about 70% of the variation in the amount of cocaine and base seized 
annually.  In all three models, the F value is significant, indicating that all three models 
provide a statistically significant explanation of the dependent variable.  Finally, all of the 
models have a Durbin-Watson statistic very close to 2, indicating little to no 
autocorrelation.  In sum, the data testing the relationship between the amount of foreign 
and aid the amount of cocaine and base seized are not statistically significant—indicating 
no causal relationship in either direction.  In addition, Colombia’s GDP per capita 
indicates that as Colombia’s economy is stimulated, the amount of cocaine and base 
seized is also expected to increase. 
Finally, the multivariate regression analysis that examines the relationship 
between the amount of coca sprayed (ha) and foreign assistance is presented in Table 5.17  
Due to the controversial nature of aerial fumigation and its recent implementation and 
then more recent suspension, when regressing the amount of coca sprayed on the amount 
of foreign assistance, it is difficult to determine how foreign aid really affects the amount 
of coca sprayed.  Aerial fumigation is relatively new and very controversial.  However, 
                                                 
17 Table 5 is located in Appendix A. 
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the United States has always supported aerial fumigation efforts—including providing 
aircrafts necessary to carry them out.  Although the United States has supported aerial 
fumigation, many environmentalists and Colombian citizens have spoken out about the 
effects it has had on legitimate crops.  In addition, Colombian citizens have expressed 
concerns about the chemicals sprayed, and how they may affect the health of those it 
comes in contact with.  Due to the controversy surrounding the subject of aerial 
fumigation, in addition to existing literature that indicates aid is not effective, it is not 
surprising that the data in Table 5 show no statistically significant relationship between 
the amount of foreign assistance (of any type) and the amount of coca sprayed.   
 However, polity score, used to measure the level of democracy in Colombia, is 
statistically significant across all three models at the 95% confidence level (or alpha of 
.05).  This indicates that as Colombia became more democratic, the amount of coca 
sprayed decreased.  Specifically, were Colombia to increase its level of democracy by 
one point on the eleven-point scale to 8, from its current 7, we would expect a decrease of 
the amount of coca sprayed by about 11,000 ha.  Again, this may reflect the heightened 
popular concern about aerial fumigation and the chemicals used in order to kill the crops.  
Not only are people concerned about the chemicals being used with regard to their health, 
but local farmers and governmental officials who support alternative crop development 
programs argue that the actual drift of the chemicals kill crops grown by nearby 
landowners.  Other concerns regarding aerial fumigation include the danger of flying the 
planes necessary to carry out the fumigation process.  There have been several instances 
where planes were shot down by guerrillas and the pilots aboard were either executed or 
kidnapped.  Therefore, if more policies are shaped by the views of the people, one could 
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expect the amount of coca sprayed in Colombia to decrease as these concerns are 
addressed.   
 In addition to polity score, Model 3 indicates that presidential affiliation is 
correlated with the amount of coca sprayed.  Specifically, if Colombia’s president 
belongs to the Conservative party, then the amount of coca sprayed is expected to 
increase by about 12,000 ha of land.  This is consistent with the fact that in 2000, foreign 
assistance drastically increased, in part, to carry out aerial fumigation objectives.  During 
this time, President Pastrana (conservative) was president.  In contrast, if a president is 
elected that is not affiliated with the Conservative party, one could expect the overall 
amount of coca sprayed to decrease.  This is currently the case with President Uribe, as 
he has suspended aerial fumigation in areas of Colombia, specifically along its border 
with Ecuador (UPI 2002:1).  Findings may largely reflect accepted and expected policies 
by the Conservative party regarding law enforcement strategies.   
In all three models, the R-squared values are high, approximately 80%, and all 
three F values are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (or alpha of .01).  
This indicates that the each model is strong and fits the data well.  In addition, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic is approximately 1.6 which indicates that the effects of 
autocorrelation cannot be determined, but are likely to be limited.  In sum, there is no 
relationship between the amount of foreign assistance and the amount out of coca sprayed 
(ha) by Colombian officials.  However, as Colombia becomes more democratic, one can 
expect a decrease in the amount of coca sprayed.  On the contrary, if Colombia’s 
president is conservative, one can expect aerial fumigation to increase.  Overall, the data 
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show no relationship between aid and eradication efforts carried out by Colombian law 
enforcement. 
Analysis of Guerrilla Violence 
To test the relationship between foreign assistance and the level of guerrilla 
activity, I regress all types of aid on the number of reported kidnappings (per thousand in 
habitants) and the number of homicides (per thousand inhabitants).  The multivariate 
regression analysis that examined the relationship between foreign assistance and persons 
kidnapped is presented in Table 6.18  Assuming that assistance to Colombia has 
successfully provided more security for its people, one would expect the number of 
kidnappings to decrease as aid increased.  However, all three models indicate that there is 
no statistically significant relationship between the amount of foreign assistance (of any 
type) and the overall number of people kidnapped.  In fact, there is no significant 
indication that Colombia’s level of democracy, GDP per capita, unemployment rate, or 
president’s party affiliation (conservative) influences the number of kidnappings (per 
thousand inhabitants) either.   
These findings lend support to theories presented by Peter Boon who argued that 
foreign aid does not reach those that it is intended to help.  Ideally, foreign assistance 
would help decrease poverty which would allow civilians to have the means necessary to 
protect themselves against guerrilla activity.  According to the World Bank, over one half 
of the population in Colombia lives in poverty (UNODC 2003:9).  Due to the extreme 
poverty in Colombia, the average civilian is at an extreme disadvantage when trying to 
protect themselves against the wealthy guerrillas.  If Boon is correct, and overall foreign 
                                                 
18 Table 6 is located in Appendix A. 
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assistance to Colombia is not reaching those that need it most, then it is not surprising to 
find no relationship between the amount of foreign aid and the number of kidnappings in 
Colombia.  Also, Boon argues that foreign aid actually increases inequality which is 
likely to increase violence.  According to the UNODC, “inequality is at the root of 
Colombia’s 40 year civil war” (UNODC 2003:9).  Therefore, if Boon is correct, and 
foreign aid is increasing inequality within Colombia, violence is expected to increase 
with aid.  In this case, the data are consistent with my hypothesis.  However, one should 
approach these findings with caution.  The data that indicate the number of kidnappings 
reported over a long period of time is not available.  The data that are available is often 
flawed because all kidnappings are not reported to authorities for fear of reprisals 
(UNODC 2003:28).  Therefore, due to the lack of data available for kidnappings and the 
ambiguity that involves the actual reporting of kidnappings, this study may not reveal the 
actual relationship between the amount of foreign assistance and the level of guerrilla 
violence with respect to kidnappings.   
 In all three models, the R-squared value is around .9 which indicates that the 
model describes approximately 90% of the variation in the amount of coca sprayed in 
Colombia annually.  In addition, all models are statistically significant at the 99% 
confidence level (or alpha .01).  In all three cases, the data indicate that the effects of 
autocorrelation cannot be determined with a Durbin-Watson statistic around 2.4.  In sum, 
foreign assistance (of any type), in addition to, all other control variables, show no 
relationship with the number of kidnappings in Colombia.  Therefore, foreign assistance 
does not seem to have influenced overall guerilla activity in Colombia with respect to the 
number of kidnappings (per thousand inhabitants).      
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The multivariate regression analysis that examines the relationship between the 
amount of U.S. foreign aid and Colombia’s homicide rate is presented in Table 7.19  If 
foreign assistance is effective, then as aid to Colombia increases, the effects of guerrilla 
violence should decrease.  Specifically, one would assume that as aid increased, the 
homicide rate would decrease.  However, the data indicate that there is no significant 
relationship between the amount of aid given to Colombia (of any type) and change in 
Colombia’s homicide rate.  This may be consistent with earlier discussions regarding 
how aid is often not distributed to those in need (Boon 1996:292).  If aid does not serve 
to alleviate inequalities in a society, then it is unlikely to decrease the violence, which is 
often rooted these inequalities (UNODC 2003:9).  This failure to address underlying 
causes of manifest problems may thereby render aid ineffective in this context and yield a 
null result in the statistical analysis.20
Another alternative explanation could be the presence of corruption within 
Colombia’s law enforcement.  If law enforcement officials are involved in the drug trade, 
then one would expect to see no connection between homicides rates and aid money 
given to corrupt agencies.  Giving additional aid to combat guerrilla activity is counter-
productive if the money is going to a corrupt institution that is responsible curbing 
guerrilla violence. 
Across all three models, GDP per capita was statistically significant at the 95% 
confidence level (or alpha .05).  These data indicated that as Colombia’s GDP per capita 
increased, Colombia’s homicide rate decreased.  With every $1,000 increase in 
                                                 
19 Table 7 is located in Appendix A. 
20 The dependent variable discussed here is the change in Colombia’s homicide rate, not its homicide rate. 
 100
Colombia’s GDP per capita, the homicide rate decreased by about .03 per one thousand 
people.  In 1986, Colombia’s homicide rate was significantly higher than usual, at .08.  If, 
for example, the GDP per capita had increased in 1998 by $1,000, the homicide rate 
could have decreased by .03, which indicates a substantively significant decrease in 
homicides by nearly half the total in that year.  These findings are as expected.  I have 
hypothesized that as Colombia’s economy improves, more money is available for the 
government to increase security throughout Colombia and to battle drug trafficking that is 
correlated to homicides.   
 In addition to GDP per capita, data in Models 1 and 2 for total aid and economic 
aid respectively indicated that as Colombia’s president is conservative, the homicide rate 
is also expected to decrease.  Specifically, when the president of Colombia was 
conservative, the homicide rate decreased by about .04.  This is most likely due to an 
emphasis within the Conservative party on law enforcement. 
 However, in all three models the R-squared value is very low and none of the F 
values are statistically significant.  This indicates that all three models are very weak.  In 
addition, the Durbin-Watson statistic across all models is in the area of indeterminacy 
with a value of about 1.5.  In sum, there is no relationship between foreign assistance and 
a change in the number of homicides (per thousand inhabitants) in Colombia.  However, 
as expected, as Colombia’s economy is stimulated, Colombia’s homicide rate decreased.  
Also, in two of the models, the Colombian president’s party affiliation had a statistically 
significant effect of reducing then number of homicides.   
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Analysis of Drug Production 
To test the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and Colombia’s overall drug 
production, I regress all categories of aid on the amount of estimated cultivation of coca 
(ha) in Colombia from 1983-2002.  The multivariate regression analysis that examines 
the relationship between the amount of estimated cultivation of coca (ha) and the amount 
of foreign assistance is presented in Table 8.21  If foreign aid projects are successful at 
curbing overall drug production in Colombia, as foreign assistance increased to 
Colombia, the amount of estimated cultivation of coca should decrease.  However, data in 
each model show that there is no significant relationship between the amount of foreign 
aid (of any type) and the amount of estimated cultivation of coca (ha) in Colombia.   
One of the primary objectives of U.S. aid to Colombia, over the years, has been to 
decrease the cultivation of coca.  Not only have aid programs supported aerial fumigation 
to discourage the growth of coca crops, but the Colombian government has also increased 
efforts in order to persuade farmers to give up growing illicit crops, by providing them 
with whatever they need to successfully cultivate alternative agricultural produce.  This 
includes money, machines, and even farm animals (Veilette 2005:5).  Although many of 
these sorts of programs have been supported by U.S. assistance, the data suggest that aid 
has also been ineffective in this area.  
The two major programs designed to address coca cultivation include aerial 
fumigation and alternative development programs.  Both are designed to reduce coca 
cultivation, however, both approaches have their limitations.  First, apart from the 
controversy surrounding aerial fumigation, this approach to influencing estimated 
                                                 
21 Table 8 is located in Appendix A. 
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cultivation does not eliminate the actual coca crop—instead, it just frustrates its growth.  
According to Cassen, one reason that foreign aid programs often fail, is due to poor 
design.  Although the United States has supported aerial fumigation, one could argue that 
aerial fumigation programs fall into the pitfall just mentioned.  Aerial fumigation is 
expensive, dangerous, and overall ineffective at addressing the overall cultivation of 
coca.  In addition, most coca growing areas are under control of the country’s guerilla 
groups.  Therefore, alternative crop development programs are only likely to affect a 
small number of farmers.  Also, alternative development programs are voluntary.  
Therefore, even if landowners are open to receiving help from the government, they may 
be fearful that getting help from the government would put them at more of a risk, since 
farmers are often targeted by guerrilla groups.  According to the UNODC (2003), the 
goal behind many homicides is to eliminate those who are collaborating with opposing 
factions.  This creates fear, terror, and displacement.  If farmers voluntarily work with 
alternative development programs, they may be putting themselves at more of a risk, than 
if they worked with the guerrillas. 
Although foreign assistance was not statistically significant in this analysis, three 
variables are significant across all three models.  First, the polity score, used to measure 
the level of democracy in Colombia, is statistically significant across all three models at 
the 95% confidence level (or alpha of .05).  These data indicate that as Colombia became 
more democratic, the amount of estimated coca cultivation decreased by approximately 
8,000 ha of land for each one-point increase on the 11-point democracy scale.22  These 
findings are consistent with what was expected.  As Colombia becomes more democratic, 
                                                 
22 The range for Colombia on the Polity Score from 1980-2002 is a low of 7 and a high of 9. 
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people may be more likely to work with the government toward the common goal of 
decreasing cultivation.  Democratic policies allow the people to have a say in solutions to 
the problem.  This may be particularly effective when trying to establish alternative 
development programs that are geared to meet the needs of farmers, including heightened 
security.  If civilians can express their needs to the government, and the government has 
the means available to meet their needs, then alternative development programs may be 
more likely to succeed—possibly decreasing cultivation.   
 In addition to Colombia’s level of democracy, the amount of estimated cultivation 
is also expected to decrease as Colombia’s rural population density increases.  
Specifically, for every additional percent increase in rural population density, the amount 
of estimated cultivation should decrease by about 2,000 ha of land.  As the rural 
population becomes more concentrated, the amount of actual land available to be 
cultivated may actually be decreasing, which provides less space for coca cultivation 
specifically.  So, as rural population density increases, the overall cultivation of coca 
declines. 
 Finally, unemployment has a statistically significant positive relationship with 
coca cultivation across all three models at the 99% confidence level (or alpha of .01).  
This finding suggests that with every additional percent increase in Colombia’s 
unemployment rate, the estimated cultivation of coca is expected to increase by about 
22,000 ha of land.  This is true across all three models.  This is also consistent with what I 
hypothesized above.  As unemployment increases, people may go to extreme measures to 
do what is necessary to provide for their families and for themselves, making them more 
likely to get involved with drug activity.  These data indicate that if programs are 
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successful in providing jobs for those who are unemployed, the estimated cultivation of 
coca will decrease; therefore, suggesting that aid, which successfully targets economic 
problems such as unemployment, is likely to have the positive effect of reducing coca 
production. 
 Across all three models, the R-squared value is high and all three F values are 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level (or alpha .01), indicating that the 
model fits the data well.  Although, it is likely that much of this model fit can be 
attributed to the large and statically significant trend variable included in the model to 
account for over-time trends in the dependent variable.  On the other hand, all three 
Durbin-Watson statistics are around 1.6, thus, the effects of autocorrelation cannot be 
determined, which should cause some caution when interpreting the results.   
In sum, as expected, foreign assistance has shown no relationship with the 
estimated cultivation of coca (ha) in Colombia.  This is likely attributed to the fact that 
both of the programs designed to target cultivation are poorly designed and are not 
expected to produce a desired outcome.  However, the data indicate that as Colombia 
became more democratic, estimated cultivation decreased.  Also, an increase in 
Colombia’s rural population density is expected to decrease cultivation, as available land 
decreases.  Finally, as expected, Colombia’s unemployment rate has a positive 
relationship with estimated cultivation; as Colombia’s unemployment rate increased, the 
amount of estimated cultivation increased. 
   In conclusion, after testing the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and 
the broader areas of Colombian society that that have been primary targets for U.S. 
assistance over the years (Colombia’s law enforcement activity, guerrilla violence, and 
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overall drug production), I find the following.  First, when testing the relationship 
between foreign aid and those dependent variables that measure the level of Colombia’s 
law enforcement, the analysis suggests that there is no relationship between foreign 
assistance and the number of drug labs destroyed, the amount of cocaine and base seized 
(kilos), and the amount of coca sprayed (ha).  Further, only in some cases do the variables 
that control for Colombia’s presidential party affiliation, its GDP per capita, and its polity 
score, have an influence on law enforcement activity.  Each of these three variables have 
notable effects on only one of the three measures of drug-related law enforcement 
activity. 
 After testing the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and those variables 
used to assess Colombia’s guerrilla violence, the analysis indicates that there is no causal 
relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and the number of kidnappings (per 
thousand in habitants) or the number of homicides (per thousand inhabitants).  However, 
both GDP per capita and presidential party affiliation have a statistical relationship with 
Colombia’s homicide rate.  As Colombia’s GDP per capita increased, and its president 
belongs to the Conservative party, the number of homicides decreased.  These findings 
are consistent with the expectations that more prosperity will decrease crime, and the 
conservative presidents are more focused on and successful at reducing crime. 
 Finally, after testing the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and 
Colombia’s drug production, the data indicate that there is no causal relationship between 
the amount of aid and estimated coca cultivation.  Although foreign aid is not statistically 
significant, improving Colombian democracy and increasing rural population density, 
both reduce the amount of estimated coca cultivation.  However, an increase in 
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Colombia’s unemployment rate is expected to increase the estimated cultivation of coca 
(ha).  Throughout all six tables, foreign assistance showed no relationship to the variables 
that represented the broader areas of Colombia’s society.    
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Conclusion 
 No country has suffered the negative consequences of violence, guerrilla activity, 
and drug-related activity more than Colombia.  Even a brief analysis of Colombia’s 
history reveals a recurring pattern of internal conflict.  Initially, such conflict resulted 
from political violence between the Conservative and Liberal parties.  In response to the 
political violence, multiple guerrilla groups emerged throughout the countryside.  
Although guerrillas originally organized to provide protection, they would soon discover 
lucrative opportunities in the drug trade, and subsequently, terrorize the people whose 
interests they once guarded. 
 As the relationship between guerillas and drug traffickers became more 
intertwined, profits attained by the drug trade allowed groups such as the FARC, ELN 
and AUC to become very wealthy and powerful—therefore having more of an influence 
than the Colombian government.  By the early 1980s, Colombia was weak, divided, and 
dominated by guerrillas and drug traffickers. 
 With the end of the Cold War, the United States was able to turn its attention from 
preventing communist influences around the world, to addressing the consequences of the 
drug trade.  By the late 1980s and early 1990s, U.S. foreign assistance was being 
distributed in order to decrease the cultivation of drugs and to increase interdiction efforts 
—especially in Colombia.    
 In 1999, Colombian President Andrés Pastrana was elected into office.  Eager to 
improve Colombia’s situation, Pastrana worked to restore U.S.-Colombian relations.  By 
2000, the United States responded to his earlier request for assistance and allotted $3.1 
billion in foreign assistance to Colombia under “Plan Colombia.”  The purpose of this 
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initiative was to help stimulate Colombia’s economy, to assist Colombia in its armed 
conflict, and most importantly, to offer aid for anti-narcotic efforts (in terms of 
preventing cultivation and reducing the distribution of drugs).   
 Although the United States has given billions of dollars in foreign assistance in 
order to support the Colombian government in fighting guerrilla activity and curbing the 
drug trade, the actual impact of foreign assistance in Colombia is undetermined.  Scholars 
continue to debate the actual effectiveness of foreign aid in achieving these and other 
similar macroeconomic and political goals.  Studies that survey the impact of foreign aid 
programs in developing countries have found that, overall, aid can have a positive effect 
on the country.  For example, some foreign aid programs have been successful at 
decreasing the price of food in poor countries.  This has had a positive impact on those 
countries because it has allowed more people to afford to buy food.  However, when the 
direct effect of foreign assistance on the growth of a developing country is tested 
empirically, scholars have found more ambiguous results.  For example, scholars such as 
Griffin and Enos (1970) and Peter Boon (1996), found that aid is not a determinant for 
growth.  On the other hand, scholars such as Burnside and Dollar (2000), found that aid 
does impact growth, but only when the policies of the recipient country are strong.  
Durbarry (1998) also found a positive relationship between foreign aid and growth.  This 
continual debate regarding the effectiveness of foreign assistance on developing countries 
is often called the “micro-macro paradox.”  On a micro-level of studying the impact of 
specific foreign assistance programs, aid seems to have a positive effect through the 
successful completion of these specific programs.  However, studies that examine the 
impact of aid on more macro-level outcomes, such as growth, are divided over the 
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effectiveness of aid.  It is clear from all of these studies that aid is only effective under a 
very controlled set of circumstances.   
 In order to address this paradox, I tested the effectiveness of U.S. foreign 
assistance on three broad areas of Colombian society which have been the target of U.S. 
foreign aid objectives overtime.  These broad areas include Colombia’s drug-related law 
enforcement activity, guerrilla violence, and overall drug production.  Specifically, in 
order to analyze the impact of foreign assistance on Colombia’s law enforcement activity, 
I tested the relationship between U.S. foreign aid and the number of drug labs destroyed, 
the amount of cocaine and base seized (kilos), and the amount of coca sprayed in 
Colombia from 1981-2001.  To examine the influence of foreign assistance on guerrilla 
violence, I tested the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and the number of 
reported kidnappings from 1990-2002 and the number of homicides from 1980-2002.  
Finally, in order to test the impact of foreign assistance on overall drug production in 
Colombia, I tested the relationship between U.S. foreign assistance and the estimated 
cultivation of coca from 1983-2002. 
Using available data that generally cover the years 1980-2002, I explore this 
relationship in two ways.  First, I examine the bivariate relationship between each 
dependent variable and the total amount of U.S. assistance to Colombia by examining 
their movement over time in graphs.  By design, of course, these results were 
inconclusive and limited, but they did suggest the lack of a connection between aid and 
the policy goals it sought to achieve in Colombia.  However, this finding was then 
confirmed by the multivariate time-series analysis of each dependent variable.  In this 
analysis, I tested the relationship of U.S. foreign assistance (total, economic, and 
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military) on all six dependent variables, while controlling for other factors.  The results of 
this analysis indicate that there is no significant connection between the amount of 
foreign assistance given to Colombia and any of the policy goals examined.  These 
findings are most consistent with research conducted by Peter Boon whose theories 
suggest that aid does not reach those in need.  Findings in this analysis support that 
theory and imply that, due to corruption and weak institutions, U.S. foreign assistance is 
not reaching those it is intended to help.       
 Although foreign aid did not have a statistically significant relationship with any 
of the policy goals, other independent variables that were controlled for throughout the 
analysis were statistically significant.  For example, when analyzing Colombia’s drug-
related law enforcement activity, data indicates that Colombia’s presidential party 
affiliation is statistically significant.  Ironically, if Colombia’s president was 
conservative, the number of drug labs destroyed decreased, but the amount of coca 
sprayed increased.  This suggests that with respect to drug-related law enforcement 
efforts, a Conservative president may approach combating drug activity by increasing 
efforts to deter the actual cultivation of coca, instead of interdiction efforts.  Colombia’s 
presidential party affiliation was not only statistically significant when analyzing drug-
related law enforcement, but it was also statically significant with respect to Colombia’s 
guerrilla activity—as it relates to Colombia’s homicide rate.  Data indicates that if 
Colombia’s president belongs to the Conservative party, then Colombia’s homicide rate 
will decrease.  Therefore, it seems as if policies that are generally accepted by the 
Conservative party stress the importance of illicit drug cultivation and heightened 
protection for its citizens.    
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In addition to presidential party affiliation, results indicated that Colombia’s 
economic situation would impact all three policy objectives.  Specifically, as Colombia’s 
economy was stimulated, interdiction efforts increased.  This is expected, because as 
Colombia’s economy flourishes, the government will have more means necessary to 
combat the drug trade—thus increasing interdiction efforts.  Also, when examining 
guerrilla activity, Colombia’s economic situation influenced its homicide rate.  As 
Colombia’s economy was stimulated, the number of homicides decreased.  This indicates 
that in addition to having the means necessary to increase security throughout the 
country, a good economic environment may deter civilians from getting involved in the 
drug trade.  Finally, along the same lines, when examining Colombia’s overall drug 
production, the effect of Colombia’s unemployment rate was statistically significant.  As 
Colombia’s unemployment rate increased, the estimated cultivation of coca also 
increased—indicating that Colombia’s economic environment is a significant determinant 
of reaching all three policy goals.      
  Finally, Colombia’s level of democracy was statistically significant when 
exploring Colombia’s drug-related law enforcement efforts and its overall drug 
production.  Specifically, as Colombia became more democratic, the amount of coca 
spraying decreased as did the amount of estimated cultivation.  This is not surprising 
since aerial fumigation is such a controversial subject.  Many farmers and civilians have 
expressed their concerns about how it affects their crops and health.  One can conclude 
that as Colombia becomes more democratic, the Colombian people will have more input 
as to how Colombia’s drug problem should be addressed.  This may encourage 
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Colombian civilians to assist the government in finding a solution to its drug 
predicament.      
Overall, the results support the argument that aid has not been effective in 
Colombia.  Given the macro-level focus of this analysis on broad outcomes rather than on 
very specific program success, these findings should not be surprising.  Most other 
similar studies have failed to find a connection between aid and macro-level indicators.  
The only exceptions (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Durbarry 1998) are studies that found a 
macro-level impact for aid only when the recipient country had the capacity for positive 
policy implementation.  Given the weakness of Colombian government institutions 
(Griffin and Enos 1970) as well as other problems that undermine policy effectiveness, it 
makes sense that U.S. aid to Colombia has thus far been largely unsuccessful in achieving 
the wide-ranging policy outcomes it seeks.  According to Griffin and Enos (1970), 
foreign aid is likely to fail when there are poor policies and institutions in place.  
Although Colombia’s policies may be strong, its institutions are weak and therefore may 
hinder foreign assistance from being distributed effectively.   
Furthermore, corruption has existed at all levels of Colombia’s society.   In fact, 
instances have surfaced where Colombian police have used U.S. narcotics foreign aid to 
pay for unauthorized trips.  Also in the past, officials throughout the Colombian 
government (usually law enforcement) have been suspected of worked with drug 
traffickers.  Therefore, if foreign assistance is going to improve those areas of Colombian 
society that are corrupt, aid is most likely going to be ineffective and possibly 
counterproductive.    
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Additionally, although the United States and Colombia have remained on close 
terms throughout the years, there have been times where U.S.-Colombian relations were 
detrimental to the effect of aid in Colombia.  In fact, Crandall (2001) discusses how the 
United States became so obsessed with taking down President Samper, it actually 
hindered the United States from meeting policy goals.  
Finally, as Boon (1996) suggests, foreign assistance my not be effective because it 
does not go to those it is intended to help.  Boon argues that often times, foreign 
assistance does not reach the poor.  It is not effective because it does not change the 
policies that favor the elite.  Therefore, when foreign assistance is distributed, it stays 
within the government and never reaches civil society.  If foreign assistance given to 
Colombia is not reaching those that it is intended to help, then it is no surprise that it has 
been ineffective.  For example, if foreign assistance does not reach those farmers who 
volunteer to work with alternative crop development programs, then farmers may have no 
choice but to work with drug traffickers to get what is necessary to survive.  From a more 
general perspective, if foreign assistance is given in order to improve law enforcement in 
Colombia, but the aid does not go towards improving both the capacity and the honesty 
of Colombia’s police and military, it may hinder the ability of law enforcement to 
increase security from border to border.   
After a brief overview of Colombia’s history, one can see how Colombia may 
need assistance in addressing its social, economic, and political problems.  However, 
assistance alone is not enough.  In the case of Colombia, we have seen that aid alone has 
limited capacities.  In order to increase the likelihood that foreign assistance may be 
effective, aid funds should be focused on promoting good policies and strong institutions 
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and eliminating opportunities for corruption.  Furthermore, aid should focus on dual 
positive effects of improving the lives of the Colombian people and mitigating the impact 
of the drug trade. 
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Appendix A 
 
Table 1. Emergence and Consolidation of the Traditional Political Parties through 
Civil Wars (1827-1910) 
Years President or ruler Opponents Nature/Outcome 
1827- 
1832 
Francisco de Paula 
Santander 
Santanderistas and 
Bolvianos 
Major conflict: break up of Gran 
Colombia. 
1839- 
1842 
General Pedro Alcántara 
Herrán 
Ministeriales/ 
Uncoordinated regional 
movements 
Civil War: “War of the Supremes.”  
Defeat of pro-federalist regional 
movements, continued rule by 
conservative forces. 
1851 José Hilario López Liberals /Conservatives 
(Slaveowners) 
Civil War: Conservatives were 
defeated. 
1854 General José Maria 
Obando(1853-54) 
General José Maria Melo 
(1854) 
Draconiano Liberals/ 
Gólgota Liberals (pro-
federalism, free trade, 
and anti-army) 
Civil War: Sparked by Coup d’état 
led by General José Maria Melo and 
supported by Draconiano Liberals 
and artisans.  Liberals crushed.  
Significant defeat for military. 
1861- 
1863 
Tomás C. de Mosquera Radical Liberals and 
Draconiano Liberals/ 
Conservatives 
Civil War: Defeat of Conservatives 
who had been in control of 
government.  Church property 
nationalized, enactment of other anti-
Church reforms and federalist 
Constitution. 
1876- 
1877 
Aquileo Parra Radical Liberals/ 
Rafael Núñez, 
Conservatives, and 
army leaders. 
Civil War after election.  
Conservatives hoped to take 
advantage of Liberal division, instead 
lead to temporary Liberal unification 
and Conservative defeat. 
1884- 
1885 
Rafael Núñez “Unión Nacional”/ 
Radical Liberals 
Liberal division and economic crisis 
placed country near civil war in 
1884. 
1885 Rafael Núñez and La 
Regeneración 
National Party/ Radical 
Liberals 
Civil War: Núñez joined by 
Conservatives, defeats Radical 
Liberals.  Leads to increased 
centralization and closer Church-state 
relations. 
1892- 
1895 
Rafael Núñez and Miguel 
Antonio Caro 
National Conservative/ 
Revolutionary Liberals 
Civil War in 1895. Brief and 
regionally concentrated.  Rev. 
Liberals, unsupported by other 
Liberals, led to temporary 
Conservative unification and Liberal 
defeat. 
1899- 
1902 
José M. Marroquin Historic and 
Nationalist 
Conservatives/ 
Civilista  Rev. Liberals 
Civil War: “War of One Thousand 
Days.”  Both sides divided, 100,000 
casualties, economic collapse, and no 
Conservatives gain control. 
Source: Hartlyn 1988:21 
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Table 2.  Key Concepts and Variables 
Concept Key Dependent Variables Source 
Law Enforcement Number of Drug Labs Destroyed 
in Colombia, 1981-2001. 
Policía Nacional de Colombia 
Law Enforcement Amount of Cocaine and Base 
Seized (kilos) in Colombia, 
1981-2001. 
Policía Nacional de Colombia 
Law Enforcement Amount of Coca Crop Sprayed 
(ha) in Colombia, 1981-2001. 
Policía Nacional de Colombia 
Guerrilla Violence Number of Reported 
Kidnappings (per thousand 
inhabitants) in Colombia, 1990-
2002. 
Policía Nacional de Colombia 
Guerrilla Violence Number of Homicides (per 
thousand in habitants) in 
Colombia, 1980-2002. 
Policía Nacional de Colombia 
Overall Drug Production Amount of Estimated 
Cultivation of Coca (ha) in 
Colombia, 1983-2002). 
International Narcotics Strategy 
Report 
Concept Key Independent Variables Source 
Total Foreign Assistance Total Loans and Grants to 
Colombia, 1980-2002. 
USAID Greenbook 
Economic Foreign Assistance Economic Loans and Grants to 
Colombia, 1980-2002. 
USAID Greenbook 
Military Foreign Assistance Military Loans and Grants to 
Colombia, 1980-2002. 
USAID Greenbook 
Concept Key Control Variables Source 
Level of Democracy Colombia’s Polity Score, 1980-
2002. 
Polity IV 
Colombia’s Average Income Colombia’s GDP per Capita, 
1980-2002. 
World Development Indicators 
2004 
President’s Party Affiliation Dummy Variable for 
Colombia’s Conservative 
Presidents. 
CIA Factbook: Colombia 
Level of Unemployment Colombia’s Unemployment 
Rate, 1980-2002. 
International Labor Office 
Land Availability for Coca 
Cultivation 
Colombia’s Rural Population 
Density, 1980-2002. 
World Development Indicators 
2004 
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 Table 3. The Effect of U.S. Aid on the Number of Drug Labs Destroyed in 
Colombia, 1981-2001 
Variable 1. Total Loans 
and Grants  
2. Economic 
Loans and Grants 
3. Military Loans 
and Grants  
Total Loans and 
Grants 
-.328 
(.387) 
- - 
Economic Loans 
and Grants 
- -.262 
(.387) 
- 
Military Loans and 
Grants 
- - -3.161 
(2.710) 
Polity Score -71.952 
(123.696) 
-77.322 
(124.783) 
-29.275 
(128.390) 
GDP per Capita -.744 
(.513) 
-.722 
(.525) 
-.398 
(.480) 
Trend 148.510 
(101.941) 
142.372 
(104.167) 
81.194 
(90.580) 
Conservative 
President 
-413.323* 
(207.048) 
-418.729* 
(208.550) 
-383.497* 
(205.498) 
Constant 3131.533* 
(1686.152) 
3121.931* 
(1729.803) 
1906.946 
(1742.739) 
Durbin-Watson 1.910 1.862 1.915 
N 21 21 21 
R2 .252 .240 .282 
F 1.012 .945 1.176 
Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent 
standard error. 
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99% 
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 Table 4. The Effect of U.S. Aid on the Amount of Cocaine and Base Seized (kilos) 
in Colombia, 1981-2001 
Variable 1.Total Loans and 
Grants 
2. Economic 
Loans and Grants 
3. Military Loans 
and Grants  
Total Loans and 
Grants 
13.214 
(17.016) 
- - 
Economic Loans 
and Grants 
- 10.084 
(17.025) 
- 
Military Loans and 
Grants 
- - 151.787 
(117.732) 
Polity Score 9027.481 
(5456.003) 
9245.933 
(5490.649) 
6928.423 
(5578.582) 
GDP per Capita 56.189** 
(22.560) 
55.019** 
(23.099) 
40.927* 
(20.862) 
Trend -7942.780 
(4486.536) 
-7631.695 
(4583.520) 
-5028.914 
(3935.721) 
Conservative 
President 
4557.249 
(9112.371) 
4784.143 
(9176.526) 
3045.226 
(8928.957) 
Constant -222528.0 
(74209.137) 
-221449.5** 
(76114.189) 
-166746.3 
(75722.598) 
Durbin-Watson 2.021 1.997 2.302 
N 21 21 21 
R2 .712 .708 .731 
F 7.428*** 7.260*** 8.136*** 
Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent 
standard error. 
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99% 
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 Table 5. The Effect of U.S. Aid on the Amount of Coca Sprayed (ha) in Colombia, 
1981-2001 
Variable 1. Total Loans 
and Grants  
2. Economic 
Loans and Grants  
3. Military Loans 
and Grants  
Total Loans and 
Grants 
-13.066 
(12.942) 
- - 
Economic Loans 
and Grants 
- -10.548 
(12.990) 
- 
Military Loans and 
Grants 
- - -120.333 
(90.432) 
Polity Score -11406.616** 
(4149.490) 
-11620.195** 
(4189.284) 
-9793.684** 
(4285.023) 
GDP per Capita -23.815 
(17.158) 
-23.003 
(17.624) 
-10.305 
(16.025) 
Trend 7594.016** 
(3412.175) 
7363.777* 
(3497.158) 
4957.791 
(3023.107) 
Conservative 
President 
1207.108 
(6930.292) 
10993.676 
(7001.554) 
12323.881* 
(6858.514) 
Constant 135103.38** 
(56438.766) 
134877.15 
(58073.998) 
87789.662 
(58164.074) 
Durbin-Watson 1.694 1.698 1.607 
N 21 21 21 
R2 .885 .883 .890 
F 23.132*** 22.545*** 24.358*** 
Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent 
standard error. 
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99% 
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 Table 6. The Effect of U.S. Aid on the Number of Kidnappings (per thousand 
inhabitants) in Colombia, 1990-2002 
Variable 1. Total Loans 
and Grants  
2. Economic 
Loans and Grants 
3. Military Loans 
and Grants 
Total Loans and 
Grants 
2.02E-005 
(.000) 
- - 
Economic Loans 
and Grants 
- 1.86E-005 
(.000) 
- 
Military Loans and 
Grants 
- - 5.06E-005 
(.000) 
Polity Score -.001 
(.004) 
-.002 
(.004) 
-.001 
(.006) 
GDP per Capita -3.28E-005 
(.000) 
-.002 
(.004) 
-5.62E-005 
(.000) 
Unemployment Rate .001 
(.003) 
.001 
(.003) 
-.002 
(.004) 
Trend .006 
(.005) 
.006 
(.005) 
.011* 
(.005) 
Conservative 
President 
.010 
(.007) 
.010 
(.008) 
.008 
(.009) 
Constant .148 
(.103) 
.168 
(.102) 
.205 
(.156) 
Durbin-Watson 2.504 2.424 2.385 
N 13 13 13 
R2 .927 .923 .884 
F 12.753*** 11.970*** 7.630** 
Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent 
standard error. 
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99% 
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 Table 7. The Effect of U.S. Aid on the Change in the Number of Homicides (per 
thousand inhabitants) in Colombia, 1980-2002 
Variable 1. Total Loans 
and Grants 
2. Economic 
Loans and Grants  
3. Military Loans 
and Grants  
Total Loans and 
Grants 
7.06E-005 
(.000) 
- - 
Economic Loans 
and Grants 
- 6.42E-005 
(000) 
- 
Military Loans and 
Grants 
- - .000 
(.000) 
Polity Score .001 
(.017) 
.002 
(.017) 
-.003 
(.019) 
GDP per Capita -3.20E-005** 
(.000) 
-3.07E-005** 
(.000) 
-2.98E-005** 
(.000) 
Unemployment Rate .010 
(.008) 
.010 
(.008) 
.014 
(.008) 
Conservative 
President 
-.042** 
(.023) 
-.041* 
(.023) 
-.003 
(.024) 
Constant .143 
(.161) 
131 
(.162) 
.159 
(.179) 
Durbin-Watson 1.693 1.650 1.553 
N 22 22 22 
R2 .375 .362 .304 
F 1.924 1.815 1.399 
Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent 
standard error. 
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99% 
 
 128
 Table 8. The Effect of U.S. Foreign Aid on the Estimated Cultivation of Coca (ha) 
in Colombia, 1983-2002 
Variable 1. Total Loans 
and Grants  
2. Economic 
Loans and Grants  
3. Military Loans 
and Grants  
Total Loans and 
Grants 
-5.151 
(10.409) 
- - 
Economic Loans 
and Grants 
- -5.025 
(10.432) 
- 
Military Loans and 
Grants 
- - -5.166 
(63.174) 
Polity Score -8357.887** 
(3109.823) 
-8438.830** 
(3130.981) 
-8142.451** 
(3303.588) 
GDP per Capita -29.501 
(17.603) 
-29.601 
(17.714) 
-26.822 
(17.140) 
Rural Population 
Density 
-2126.585** 
(973.237) 
-2129.394* 
(980.687) 
-1920.551* 
(900.973) 
Unemployment Rate 22376.039*** 
(2596.509) 
22376.713*** 
(2606.251) 
22717.103*** 
(2534.166) 
Trend 13795.489*** 
(3535.540) 
13804.290*** 
(3568.742) 
12921.122*** 
(3149.314) 
Conservative 
President 
4595.254 
(4455.275) 
4560.592 
(4452.346) 
4419.429 
(4494.885) 
Constant 149071.86** 
(52279.339) 
150040.59** 
(53580.570) 
135877.23** 
(49487.683) 
Durbin-Watson 1.622 1.648 1.584 
N 20 20 20 
R2 .995 .995 .995 
F 319.460*** 319.122*** 313.212*** 
Note: Estimated Using OLS Regression, SPSS 14. Numbers in parenthesis represent 
standard error. 
* significant at 90%, ** significant at 95%, ***significant at 99% 
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Figure 1. Total U.S. Loans and Grants to Colombia, 1980-2002 
Source: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 2006 
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Figure 2. Number of Drug Labs Destroyed in Colombia, 1981-2001 
Source: Policía Nacional de Colombia 2006; U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 2006 
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Figure 3. Amount of Cocaine and Base Seized (kilos) and Coca Sprayed (ha) in 
Colombia, 1981-2001 
Source: Policía Nacional de Colombia 2006  
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Figure 4. Number of Kidnappings (per thousand inhabitants) in Colombia, 1990-
2002 
Source: Policía Nacional de Colombia 2006 
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Figure 5. Number of Homicides (per thousand inhabitants) in Colombia, 1980-2002 
Source: Policía Nacional de Colombia 2006 
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Figure 6. Estimated Cultivation of Coca (ha) in Colombia, 1983-2002 
Source: International Narcotics Strategy Report 2006 
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